What Your Death Certificate Says About You May Be Wrong: A Narrative Review on CDC’s Efforts to Quantify Prescription Opioid Overdose Deaths

What Your Death Certificate Says About You May Be Wrong: A Narrative Review on CDC’s Efforts to Quantify Prescription Opioid Overdose Deaths

https://www.cureus.com/articles/68550-what-your-death-certificate-says-about-you-may-be-wrong-a-narrative-review-on-cdcs-efforts-to-quantify-prescription-opioid-overdose-deaths

Abstract

Mortality data in most countries are reported using the International Classification of Diseases (ICD), managed by the WHO. In this paper, we show how the ICD is ill-suited for classifying drug-involved deaths, many of which involve polysubstance abuse and/or illicitly manufactured fentanyl (IMF).

Opioids identified in death certificates are categorized according to six ICD T-codes: opium (T40.0), heroin (T40.1), methadone (T40.3), other synthetic narcotics (T40.4), and other and unspecified narcotics (T40.6). Except for opium, heroin, and methadone, all other opioids except those that are unspecified are aggregated in two T-codes (T40.2 and T40.4), depending upon whether they are natural/semisynthetic or synthetic opioids other than methadone. The result is a system that obscures the actual cause of most drug overdose deaths and, instead, just tallies the number of times each drug is mentioned in an overdose situation.

We examined the CDC’s methodology for coding other controlled substances according to the ICD and found that, besides fentanyl, the ICD does not distinguish between other licit and illicitly manufactured controlled substances. Moreover, we discovered that the CDC codes all methadone-related deaths as resulting from the prescribed form of the drug. These and other anomalies in the CDC’s mortality reporting are discussed in this report.

We conclude that the CDC was at fault for failing to correct the miscoding of IMF. Finally, we briefly discuss some of the public policy consequences of this error, the misguided focus by public health and safety officials on pharmaceutical opioids, their prescribers and users, and the pressing necessity for the CDC to reassess how it measures and reports drug-involved mortality.

Introduction & Background

Vital statistics provide an important measure of a nation’s health and welfare. In this report, we focus on mortality statistics compiled and reported by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). In 2019, the CDC reported a total of 2,854,838 deaths in the United States (US) [1]. Of this number, 173,040 deaths (6%) were “unintentional injury deaths,” a category that includes falls, motor vehicle traffic deaths, and unintentional poisoning deaths (i.e., drug overdose deaths) [2]. The number of unintentional poisoning deaths reported by the CDC for 2019 was 71,130 [3]. While only 2.5% of the total deaths in 2019, unintentional poisoning deaths account for more than a third (38%) of all unintentional injury deaths. This percentage is likely to increase as CDC’s preliminary estimates for 2020 show 93,000 drug overdose deaths – an increase of 30.7% over the previous year [3].

The process of recording deaths begins with the death certificate, a document that has critical administrative and epidemiologic applications. It is used to settle estates, resolve insurance claims, terminate pensions and public benefits, identify causes of morbidity and mortality, establish public health policies, and inform the allocation and expenditure of public funds for such purposes [4]. In the US, registering individual births and deaths is a state responsibility, while the responsibility for compiling and publishing national vital statistics rests with the federal government, specifically the CDC [5].

William Farr, a 19th-century British registrar general, in his annual report of deaths in 1840, warned certifiers to be specific in recording cause of death descriptions and to avoid the use of vague statements like “sudden death,” “natural death,” “visitation of God,” and “old age.” These, he said, obscured the proximate cause – what he referred to as the “internal morbid process.” [6]. Voiced more than 180 years ago, Farr’s words remain true today and apply to death certifiers in the US and more than a hundred nations of the world that use some form of the death certification process to register and report mortality.

Although not a focus of this paper, the recent COVID-19 pandemic and the unusual fluctuations in global mortality ascribed to the coronavirus have uncovered some of the limitations in the current systems used by nations reporting COVID-19 deaths. According to figures compiled by Johns Hopkins University of Medicine’s Coronavirus Resource Center, between the beginning of the pandemic and December 15, 2020, global COVID-19 deaths fluctuated from a low of 0.3 per 100,000 population in China to a high of 156.5 per 100,000 population in Belgium. The US reported 91.6 deaths per 100,000 during this period [7]. A statistical range of such magnitude suggests inconsistencies in how individual nations define and report COVID-19 mortality.

In the US, timelines and procedures for reporting and investigating accidental or suspicious deaths are set by state law and vary among states and even within states [8]. In the case of deaths that are neither accidental nor suspicious, the process of certifying the cause of death begins with the attending physician who is likely to have access to the decedent’s health record, including details of preexisting conditions that may have caused or contributed to death [9]. Upon completion and receipt by state registrars of vital statistics, portions of the death certificate, including the cause of death entries, are forwarded electronically to the CDC National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) for inclusion in the National Death Index (Figure 1) [10].

One of the weakest links in this chain is at the beginning when the immediate and contributory causes of death are recorded by the certifying official. An error made or an incomplete cause of death at this juncture will pass from state to federal officials and result in a loss of data or worse, the corruption of the mortality database itself.

Review

The US standard death certificate

As noted, the federal government has legal responsibility for annually publishing the nation’s vital statistics, including the manner and causes of deaths [11]. The US standard death certificate is the source document for compiling these statistics [11]. Since 1960, collecting this information has been the responsibility of the NCHS, a subdivision of the CDC [11,12]. The National Vital Statistics System (NVSS), a program within the NCHS, is responsible for receiving, compiling, and publishing this information [12].

Death certificate data, including cause(s) of death, are entered into the NVSS database by technicians using software that converts the literal language of the certifiers into category codes according to the WHO’s International Classification of Diseases (ICD) [13]. Each year, the NVSS handles about 2.9 million death reports. They pass through an automated system that does not control for the accuracy or completeness of the data. Thus, the CDC begins its task of compiling national mortality data with raw source data that, according to the CDC’s estimate, arrives at the agency with an acknowledged error rate between 20-30% [14].

CDC guidelines for completing the standard death certificate require certifiers to list a single immediate cause of death in Section 32, Part I, along with a brief description of the sequence and timing of contributing causes leading up to the immediate cause of death. In Section 32, Part II, of the death certificate a certifier may include up to 20 contributory causes of death [13].

Over 20 years ago, an expert panel of state registrars and CDC officials proposed changes to the standard death certificate that eventually resulted in the creation of the electronic death registration system (EDRS) [15]. Being able to file a death certificate electronically greatly improved the efficiency of the process, but did little to improve accuracy. Hanzlick, a noted forensic pathologist, described this process as follows: “If a cause of death is stated improperly or not clearly, the person who classifies and codes the cause of death (a nosologist) uses a somewhat arbitrarily established system of rules to identify a cause of death for coding and official classification.” [16]

The “arbitrarily established system of rules” Hanzlick mentioned is the ICD [16]. “Our national mortality statistics,” Hanzlick cautioned, “are derived from codes, which, in turn, have been derived from causes of death as written on death certificates by certifiers. The value of an accurately and clearly stated cause of death to ensure proper coding and classification of deaths cannot be overstated.” [16]. Although addressing present-day issues involving the EDRS and the ICD, Hanzlick’s concerns echoed those of 19th-century Registrar General Farr mentioned earlier.

In 2004, the CDC published detailed instructions and examples for completing its revised death certificate [17]. Examples of the completed cause of death entries for Section 32, Parts I & II, of the standard death certificate are given in Figure 2.

While Section 32 of the death certificate provides the immediate and contributory causes of death, other sections, notably Sections 32-37, contain useful and relevant information. The CDC’s guidance notes that in a drug-involved death, a toxicological analysis may detect multiple substances but only those in the opinion of the certifying official that is determined to have caused or contributed to the death should be listed [13]. In the example shown in Figure 3, acetaminophen and nicotine were detected along with several other drugs in the toxicology screen of a drug overdose victim but since acetaminophen and nicotine did not cause nor contribute to death, they were not listed as an immediate cause of death [13].

How ICD coding may obscure the true cause of death

Using the example in Figure 2, we see that the CDC’s NVSS codes each drug identified as a cause of death separately according to its ICD T-code (e.g., T40.2 for hydrocodone, T40.2 for oxycodone, and T42.4 for alprazolam). Lost in many fatal drug overdose cases are the true cause of death, namely the additive toxic and often fatal consequences of co-ingesting opioids, benzodiazepines (e.g., alprazolam), and other central nervous system depressants. Studies have linked these drugs, especially when co-ingested in non-therapeutic doses, to increased risk of respiratory depression, coma, and death [18,19].

In a research letter published by the Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA) in 2018, several government scientists reported that among the 42,249 opioid-related overdose deaths in 2016, 19,413 deaths (45.9%) involved synthetic opioids. Of these deaths, 79.7% involved another drug or alcohol. The most common co-involved substances were another opioid (47.9%), heroin (29.8%), cocaine (21.6%), prescription opioids (20.9%), benzodiazepines (17.0%), alcohol (11.1%), psychostimulants (5.4%), and antidepressants (5.2%) [20].

In drug overdose death cases, significant epidemiologic information is lost when each drug mentioned in the death certificate finds its way into a specific ICD T-code category. Presumably, this enables CDC officials to be able to state a percentage of drug overdose deaths each year in which, for example, T40.2 or T42.4 drugs were involved. However, aggregating data like this obscures not only the prevalence of specific drugs in causing overdose deaths but also ignores entirely the real cause of most fatal overdoses, namely, the additive or toxic interactive effects of polysubstance abuse.

In 2013, CDC scientists published a research letter in which they characterized specific classes of drugs involved in drug-related overdose deaths [21]. More than 20 drug classes were identified by T-codes in a chart showing the number and percentages of times they were mentioned in “pharmaceutical overdose deaths” in 2010 [21]. “Opioid analgesics (T40.2-T40.4)” were involved in 16,651 overdose deaths and “Benzodiazepines (T42.4)” were involved in 5,017 overdose deaths (77.2% of all opioid-involved deaths) [21]. A footnote seemed to acknowledge the limited usefulness of this information: “Deaths are not mutually exclusive. Deaths involving more than one drug or drug class are counted multiple times.” [21]. Thus, the death of the hypothetical person whose cause of death information appears in Figure 2, according to the CDC’s methodology for coding drug overdose deaths, would be counted three times – once for each ICD T-coded drug in the death certificate! This limitation, coupled with the CDC’s estimate that 20-30% of death certificates in drug-related cases arrive listing incomplete or imprecise causes, such as “multiple drug intoxication,” or “suspected drug overdose,” etc., draws our attention to Hanzlick’s concerns.

Becoming a mortality statistic

The path between being certified a death of any cause or manner and becoming a national statistic is a relatively short but important one that typically involves a funeral director, medical certifier (attending physician, medical examiner/coroner, etc.), state vital statistics registrar, and, ultimately, the CDC [13]. As previously mentioned, anonymized death certificate information is shared by state registrars with the CDC [13]. At a minimum, this includes sharing demographic characteristics of the decedent, the time, place, and manner of death, and the literal text of the cause of death as provided by the certifier [13]. Timelines and procedures for reporting deaths and conducting postmortem examinations are set by state law and vary widely among states and sometimes even within states [22].

If a death certificate is not completed properly, the public registrar of vital statistics in the jurisdiction where it is filed may be expected to return it to the certifying official [23]. Multiple studies have shown, however, that death certificate errors are common and certificates rarely are returned to the certifier for correction or completion [24-26]. Death certificate errors have been discussed in the literature since the 1950s, with analyses of data going back to the 1800s [25-28]. Errors and incompletions in death certificates have not been limited to drug overdose cases. For example, studies have shown that ischemic heart disease is vastly overrepresented as a cause of death [29,30]. In a 1998 study of death certificates, it was estimated that the error rate for overestimating coronary heart disease as a cause of death was between 7.9-24.3%, and in older persons, it is as much as twofold [29,31]. Conversely, diabetes and dementia are often under-reported as causes of death [29,30]. In drug overdose cases, when a prescription opioid is believed to be involved, the cause of death frequently is listed as “opioid overdose,” regardless of any other aspect of the clinical situation [32].

As noted earlier, 20-30% of drug overdose death certificates arrive at the CDC with the erroneous or incomplete cause of death certifications [33]. Dr. Robert Anderson, chief of the Mortality Statistics Branch of the NVSS, has been quoted as saying that before the current coronavirus pandemic, one in every three death certificates was ‘wrong’ and that things were about to get worse [14]. This percentage of error is in keeping with the findings of previous studies of the accuracy of death certificate source data [33,34].

Swedish researchers, conducting a metadata assessment of 44 death certificate studies found that methodological variances among certifiers were responsible for different results, some of which were inconsistent with WHO standards [35]. Comparing death certificates with hospital discharge records, they noted a greater risk of certification errors for some diagnostic groups [35]. Malignant neoplasm cases had the highest degree of accuracy, whereas benign and unspecified tumor and chronic obstructive lung disease had the lowest degree of accuracy [36].

Physicians and death certificate errors

Wexelman conducted an anonymous online survey of 531 physician residents in New York City responding to a questionnaire about their experiences in completing death certificates [37]. Only 33.3% believed that cause of death reporting is accurate [37]. Of the 531 respondents, 48.6% admitted to knowingly certifying an inaccurate cause of death [37]. Of respondents who indicated they reported an inaccurate cause of death, 76.8% said that they did so because the system would not accept the correct cause. Of these, 40.5% said admitting office personnel instructed them to “put something else” (as a cause of death), and 30.7% said a medical examiner instructed them to change their initial entry [37]. If the initial cause was rejected by the EDRS software, almost two-thirds (64.6%) of the respondents said that they would instead cite cardiovascular disease, reasoning that everyone dies of cardiac arrest [37].

Education appears to exert a positive effect on improving the accuracy of death certificate information. In a literature review of educational programs designed to improve death certificate accuracy, Aung et al. (2010) concluded that “Pragmatic education on best practice for cause-of-death certification is a basic step to ensure accurate information for each individual case.” [38].

While physicians are often the focus of death certificate errors and inaccurate cause of death entries, it is worth noting that they are not the only professionals responsible for completing the death certificate. Funeral directors are responsible for completing the second and third sections of the standard death certificate, as well as making sure the cause of death section has been completed by the appropriate medical or certifying official [39]. Funeral directors are not authorized to complete the cause of death entries reserved exclusively for medical personnel [39]. However, in some states, non-physicians, such as nurse-practitioners and coroners, are authorized to certify a decedent’s cause of death [40]. In Texas, state law requires that a Justice of the Peace must conduct an inquest into the death of someone who dies of suspicious or unusual circumstances, not necessarily requiring autopsies or even viewing the body [41]. The inquest may require a formal autopsy by a medical examiner or forensic pathologist, which are only in larger counties, and a hearing to determine the cause of death [41]. At the conclusion of the inquest, the Justice of the Peace completes the death certificate, including certifying the cause of death [41].

Coroners and medical examiners

Although they share similar medico-legal responsibilities, there are significant differences between medical examiners and coroners. The origin of the coroner system is obscure, but the first mention of it dates to the 12th century [42]. The system of coroner followed England’s colonization around the world [42]. In the US, coroners are elected officials in many jurisdictions and only four states require that they be physicians [43]. According to the CDC, 16 states (and Washington, DC) have centralized medical examiner systems, six states have a county or district-based medical examiner system, 14 states have a county-based system with a mixture of coroner and medical examiner office, 14 states have a county-, district-, or parish-based coroner system, and 25 states solely have state medical examiners [44]. Qualifications to become a coroner differ among states. In Georgia, to run for the office of coroner one must be at least 25 years of age, a registered voter, a high school graduate, and not have a felony conviction [45]. In 2016, of Georgia’s 154 coroners, only one was a physician and four had criminal records [45]. According to the Atlanta Journal-Constitution (AJC), the state’s largest newspaper, the job of coroner is considered a part-time job in Georgia and the AJC’s review of state records showed coroners listing their other occupations as farmer, car wash owner, hairdresser, plumber, etc. [45]. The AJC examined thousands of death certificates issued statewide since 2011 and found almost three dozen cases in which coroners ruled that shooting victims died of “natural causes.” [45]. In nearly four of every 10 cases ruled a suicide, no autopsy was performed to confirm the cause and manner of death [45]. Although coroners who are not physicians cannot perform autopsies, they are responsible for making the initial decision for when an autopsy is required. If the initial decision is erroneous, as mentioned in the examples of suicide reported by the AJC investigation, the result is a loss of the data for which the death certification system was created in the first place.

The US is not alone in tolerating these conditions. Kelsall and Bowes [46] reported that in Canada, “(T)here is no accreditation system for coroner or medical examiner offices, no national standards for the investigation or classification of death, no nationally recognized training program or credentialing system for coroners and medical examiners, and no agreement on common outcome measures against which to evaluate performance.” Autopsy requirements vary widely among Canadian provinces and the authors, both physicians, contend that “assigning deaths as ‘undetermined’ in cases of drug overdose, for example, because an autopsy was not done, precludes efforts to prevent future deaths.” [46].

International Classification of Diseases

Technically known as the International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems, the ICD is considered by the WHO to be the world’s “bedrock for health statistics.” [47]. As the WHO describes the ICD, “It maps the human condition from birth to death: any injury or disease we encounter in life − and anything we might die of − is coded.” [48]. While coding, that is, the assigning of alphanumeric codes to diseases and injuries represents the core genius of the ICD for harmonizing global health statistics, it also may hamper the proper classification of important information when coding categories and guidelines are too restrictive. Originally developed to classify mortality and to provide a coding schema for reporting causes of death, the ICD has expanded over the years to include classifying morbidity and many other items, services, and procedures related to the delivery of healthcare [48].

In the US, the ICD consists of two components, identified as ICD-10-CM, for clinical modifications, and ICD-10-PCS, for procedural coding systems [48]. The NCHS, with guidance from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, has responsibility for developing the ICD-10’s clinical modifications used in the US [48]. In 1999, the final year for using ICD-9, there were 13,000 diagnostic codes in the US clinical modifications version [49]. ICD-10 that followed ICD-9 included 68,000 codes in its clinically modified version – a fivefold increase [50]. Chapter 19 of the ICD-10 established two subcategories identified as S and T codes [51]. The S codes are for various single body region injuries, and the T codes cover injuries to unspecified body locations, poisonings, and other external consequences [51]. Containing more than 40,000 individual codes for characterizing health-related topics and items, the ICD has just six T-codes for identifying all opioids: T40.0 (opium), T40.1 (heroin), T40.2 (other natural and semisynthetic opioids, including morphine, codeine, oxycodone, hydrocodone, hydromorphone, and oxymorphone), T40.3 (methadone), T40.4 (synthetic opioids other than methadone, including fentanyl, meperidine, pentazocine, propoxyphene, tapentadol, buprenorphine, and tramadol), and, finally, T40.6 (other and unspecified narcotics) (Figure 4) [50].

CDC finally comes clean – maybe!

In 2018, four senior CDC analysts, including the head of the Epidemiology and Surveillance Branch, published a three-page editorial acknowledging that the number of US deaths in 2016 attributed to prescription opioid overdoses was erroneously overstated [51]. The problem was caused by including IMF in the coding category – T40.4, synthetic opioids – for the prescribed version: “Thus, rates of prescription opioid-involved deaths estimated with the traditional method may have been inflated in recent years because of the increase in death rates involving synthetic opioids (e.g., fentanyl).” [52]. According to internal CDC reports, the IMF problem was discovered during the analysis of 2015 data being prepared for the 2016 report of prescription opioid overdose deaths [Courtney Lenard, Public Affairs Officer, CDC. Email to Puja Seth, Chief, Epidemiology and Surveillance Branch, CDC, dated March 27, 2018, Subject: Interview Request (talking points) (unpublished); Obtained by John J. Coleman on January 20, 2021, via Freedom of Information Act Request re: Case 21-00194-FOIA, along with the letter from HHS signed Roger Andoh, FOIA Officer (unpublished; available from the correspondence author of this article upon reasonable request). 2018.]. Although it took two years for the problem to be explained in a journal article, the CDC was aware of IMF long before a sudden spike in deaths attributed to synthetic opioids in 2015 was traced to IMF [53]. In 2008, the CDC published a report of what it called “Nonpharmaceutical Fentanyl-Related Deaths,” a form of illicitly produced fentanyl that appeared in multiple US states during the period from April 2005 to March 2007 [54]. Nonpharmaceutical fentanyl, according to the 2008 CDC report, was responsible for more than a thousand deaths in the US over the course of two years [54]. In 2013, IMF reappeared causing deaths in the northeast [55]. Rhode Island authorities notified the CDC that acetyl fentanyl, a fentanyl analog up to five times as potent as fentanyl, had been identified in 10 drug overdose deaths in the state between March 7 and April 11, 2013 [56]. During and shortly after the month-long investigation in Rhode Island, four more overdose deaths occurred [56]. Besides the Rhode Island deaths, a CDC field report at the time cited a cluster of 50 similar IMF deaths reported by authorities in Pennsylvania [56]. In their editorial, the CDC analysts reported that until 2016, the NVSS calculated annual prescription opioid overdose deaths by summing deaths coded T40.2, T40.3, and T40.4 [57]. The latter code – T40.4 – was identified as the source of error in the 2016 data [58]. All mentions of fentanyl – including non-prescribed IMF – were coded T40.4 by the agency’s nosologists [57]. In 2016, the sum of the three codes amounted to 32,445 deaths [58]. This figure, the CDC analysts acknowledged, was erroneous because it included deaths involving IMF that were mistakenly coded and counted as a “prescribed” synthetic opioid [57,58]. To correct the error, the CDC analysts proposed what they called a ‘conservative’ method for re-calculating prescription opioid overdose deaths in 2016 and prior years [57]. Their conservative method simply removed all deaths coded T40.4 from the count [57]. This, in turn, reduced the number of prescription opioid overdose deaths in 2016 from 32,445 to 17,087 – a sizable drop of 47.3% [57]. The analysts candidly conceded, however, that the “conservative” approach likely produced an undercount error because by deleting all T40.4 deaths, they were removing an unknown number of deaths caused by, or involving, prescription fentanyl, as well as deaths caused by, or involving, other prescription opioids identified with the same T40.4 code (e.g., meperidine, pentazocine, propoxyphene, tapentadol, buprenorphine, and tramadol) [57].

The discovery of the T-code error in the CDC’s prescription opioid overdose death figures for 2016 prompted us to search for other examples of similar errors in the CDC’s coding system for controlled substances. We discovered that benzodiazepines, a class of drugs often associated with fatal opioid drug overdoses, are undifferentiated in ICD T-codes [59]. More than a dozen FDA-approved benzodiazepine drugs are identified by a single ICD T-code (T42.4) [59]. In 2018, according to the National Institute on Drug Abuse, benzodiazepines were involved in 15.8% of all drug overdose deaths (Figure 5) [60]. While the aggregate coding of all benzodiazepines is not an error, per se, it does reduce the epidemiological value and specificity of the data. In their 2018 article, the CDC analysts did not acknowledge these limitations or other miscoding errors for drugs other than IMF. We, however, discovered similar anomalies in the CDC’s use of the ICD for reporting non-opioid overdose mortality. For example, cocaine, a controlled substance that is FDA-approved for medical use, is also manufactured illicitly and sold on the street as cocaine or cocaine base (also known as “crack”) [61,62]. Despite important epidemiological differences between the licit and illicit forms of cocaine, all references to this drug in the ICD are categorized under a single T-code (T40.5) [59].

Methadone: prescribed for pain but administered/dispensed for opioid use disorder (OUD)

While investigating the topic, we discovered a more serious source of error involving the CDC’s handling of methadone-related overdose deaths. Methadone is a Schedule II opioid agonist with dual indications for the management of severe chronic pain and for treating opioid use disorder (OUD) [63]. When used for pain treatment, methadone is subject to the same regulations as any other Schedule II prescription drug. However, when used for treating OUD, federal law prohibits the prescribing of methadone [64,65]. Methadone used for treating OUD must be administered or dispensed by an authorized practitioner in an opioid treatment program (OTP) certified by the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) and registered by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) [63,66,67]. Patients admitted for OUD treatment with methadone receive the medication under the direct supervision of a practitioner authorized to dispense or administer (but not prescribe) the medication to the patient in liquid oral form. Patients must visit the OTP for the first 90-days to be administered daily doses of methadone. After this period, take-home doses of methadone may be approved for dispensing to the patient by the OTP, provided that certain criteria are met [66,67]. During the COVID-19 pandemic, SAMHSA relaxed take-home rules to allow states with declared health emergencies to request an exemption for stable methadone patients, regardless of time in the program, to receive as much as 28 days of take-home doses of methadone [68]. While necessary, take-home methadone has been identified with diversion and misuse because of the drug’s high street value [69]. According to the director of the largest opiate treatment program in Baltimore, a 28-day supply of diverted methadone is worth as much as $2,000 on the street [69].

 In 2014, according to the CDC, methadone accounted for approximately 1% of all opioids prescribed for pain but was involved in approximately 23% of all prescription opioid deaths [70]. The CDC did not report how many methadone deaths resulted from the prescribed form (i.e., for pain), and how many methadone deaths resulted from the nonprescribed form (i.e., administered/dispensed for OUD treatment). Citing no evidence other than the total number of deaths from methadone, a CDC report in 2017 claimed that “the preponderance of methadone-associated morbidity and mortality likely arises from its use for pain.” [70]. This assumption, however, is not supported by the record. Prescribed methadone, dispensed by retail pharmacies, in the US decreased 71.2% between 2010 and 2019 (from 6,068,686.51 grams to 1,746,684.03 grams) [71]. During the same period, the volume of nonprescribed methadone administered/dispensed by OTPs increased 49.9% (from 8,746,056.41 grams to 13,114,262.44 grams) [71]. In 2017, the year that the CDC reported the data “the preponderance of methadone-associated morbidity and mortality likely arises from its use for pain,” the volume of nonprescribed methadone administered or dispensed by OTPs was more than fourfold the volume of methadone prescribed for pain (11,686,565 grams administered/dispensed by OTPs vs. 2,740,641 grams prescribed for pain) (Figure 6) [71].

The data in Figure 6 show what appears to be an inverse relationship in the use of methadone between the two populations, i.e., chronic pain patients and OUD patients. Given what is known about ICD coding and how its use skewed CDC mortality figures for prescription opioid overdose deaths in 2016, the subject of how the CDC codes methadone-involved deaths demand scrutiny. It seems like CDC’s annual tally of prescription opioid overdose deaths, which includes all methadone-involved deaths, continues to be skewed by including deaths involving non-prescribed methadone.

The CDC ignored error signals in calculating prescription opioid overdose deaths

In their 2018 article, the CDC analysts (Seth et al.) provided a table showing the calculation of prescription opioid overdose deaths from 1999 to 2016, describing what they termed a “conservative” approach and a “traditional” approach (Table 1) [52]. By 2013, the number of deaths in the T40.4 category (see the column in Table 1 titled, “Synthetic opioids, other than methadone”) began to increase sharply after several years of relative stability [52]. By 2016, this category had increased over 525% (from 3,105 deaths in 2013 to 19,413 deaths in 2016) [52]. By 2016, the CDC’s data were showing that more than 37.4% of all prescription opioid deaths were being caused by “synthetic opioids other than methadone,” the T40.4 category that besides fentanyl, includes pethidine (meperidine), pentazocine, propoxyphene, tapentadol, tramadol, and buprenorphine [52]. The CDC findings regarding T40.4 drugs were inconsistent with prescribing data available at the time showing that the volume of fentanyl dispensed by retail pharmacies in the US declined between 2013 and 2016 by 13.2% (from 403,773.3 grams to 350,397.3 grams) [72]. In the past, CDC analysts have described a close linear relationship between sales volumes of opioids and opioid overdose deaths, showing that whenever sales increase, they are followed by proportional increases in overdose deaths [73-76]. If one assumes that the converse of this also is true, i.e. a decrease in opioid sales is associated with fewer overdose deaths, there should have been a decrease – not an increase – in prescription fentanyl overdose deaths for the period in question.

Conservative definition for prescription opioids: natural and semisynthetic opioids and methadone Traditional definition for prescription opioids: natural and semisynthetic opioids and methadone, and other synthetic opioids Synthetic opioids other than methadone
Year Number Overdose deaths per 100,000 Number Overdose deaths per 100,000 Number Overdose deaths per 100,000
2000 3785 1.3 4400 1.5 782 0.3
2001 4770 1.7 5528 1.9 957 0.3
2002 6483 2.3 7456 2.6 1295 0.4
2003 7461 2.6 8517 2.9 1400 0.5
2004 8577 2.9 9857 3.4 1664 0.6
2005 9612 3.2 10928 3.7 1742 0.6
2006 11589 3,9 13723 4.6 2707 0.9
2007 12796 4.2 14408 4.8 2213 0.7
2008 13149 4.3 14800 4.8 2306 0.8
2009 13523 4.4 15597 5.0 2946 1.0
2010 14583 4.7 16651 5.4 3007 1.0
2011 15140 4.9 16917 5.4 2666 0.8
2012 14240 4.5 16007 5.1 2628 0.8
2013 14145 4.4 16235 5.1 3105 1.0
2014 14838 4.6 18893 5.9 5544 1.8
2015 15281 4.7 22598 7.0 9580 3.1
2016 17087 5.2 32445 10.2 19413 6.2

By 2013, the number of deaths in the T40.4 category (see the column in Table 1 titled, “Synthetic opioids, other than methadone”) began to increase sharply after several years of relative stability [52]. By 2016, this category had increased over 525% (from 3,105 deaths in 2013 to 19,413 deaths in 2016) [52]. By 2016, the CDC’s data were showing that more than 37.4% of all prescription opioid deaths were being caused by “synthetic opioids other than methadone,” the T40.4 category that besides fentanyl, includes pethidine (meperidine), pentazocine, propoxyphene, tapentadol, tramadol, and buprenorphine [52]. The CDC findings regarding T40.4 drugs were inconsistent with prescribing data available at the time showing that the volume of fentanyl dispensed by retail pharmacies in the US declined between 2013 and 2016 by 13.2% (from 403,773.3 grams to 350,397.3 grams) [72]. In the past, CDC analysts have described a close linear relationship between sales volumes of opioids and opioid overdose deaths, showing that whenever sales increase, they are followed by proportional increases in overdose deaths [73-76]. If one assumes that the converse of this also is true, i.e. a decrease in opioid sales is associated with fewer overdose deaths, there should have been a decrease – not an increase – in prescription fentanyl overdose deaths for the period in question.

 Instead, according to Table 1, three of every five drug overdose deaths (19,413/32,445 = 59.8%) in 2016 were coded T40.4 (“Synthetic opioids, other than methadone”). A rapid increase in overdose deaths caused by T40.4 drugs, a category that includes fentanyl and several other scheduled opioids, simply made no sense at a time when the prescribing of all T40.4 drugs, including fentanyl, was stable or declining (Figure 7).

Buprenorphine, the only T40.4 drug showing an increase during this time, like methadone, has a dual indication for treating pain and OUD [77]. Because it is a Schedule III drug, physicians can apply for authorization to prescribe buprenorphine for the treatment of OUD [78,79]. DEA distribution records do not differentiate between buprenorphine prescribed for treating pain and buprenorphine prescribed for treating OUD. Given the expansion of out-patient treatment of OUD with buprenorphine in the last decade, it is reasonable to assume the increased volume of prescribed buprenorphine depicted reflects the increased prescribing of the drug for OUD treatment [80].

Discussion

The modern death certificate may have taken five centuries to create, but, as our study is showing, some of the problems that plagued its earliest versions continue today. The decentralization of authority for certifying and reporting deaths has produced substantial differences in how causes of death are characterized and reported. By any measure, the error rate in death certifications, especially in drug-involved cases, remains excessive. It is critical that death data are accurate for obvious reasons. If data used by the CDC have significant error rates, which appears to be the case, there needs to be adjustments made to improve the accuracy of this program. We are not the first authors to suggest this; errors in mortality causes and reporting, as noted above, have been described in the literature for decades. 

The US government reports that health expenditures in 2017 amounted to $3.4 trillion, a sizable portion of which was spent on disease prevention and control [81]. When the source data for achieving public health goals are less than accurate, as in the situations highlighted in this paper, policymakers and public health officials are likely to focus attention and resources on the wrong things – such as the sources for prescribed fentanyl instead of the sources for illicitly manufactured non-prescribed fentanyl and fentanyl analogs. Mortality resulting from cardiovascular disease may be imprecisely overstated because of software limitations and input errors. As briefly mentioned earlier, reports of COVID-19 deaths according to WHO guidelines appear inconsistent and unreliable among reporting nations. All these problems begin but do not end with the death certificate.

In 2018, the same year that the CDC finally admitted that its system for tabulating prescription opioid overdose deaths was flawed, Congress enacted the Support for Patients and Communities Act [82]. The 250-page Act contained more than a hundred references to drug overdose prevention [82]. In Subtitle Q, Sect. 392A, “Preventing Overdoses of Controlled Substances,” the CDC was directed to coordinate “controlled substance overdose data collection” by, among other things, “(C) Modernizing the system for coding causes of death related to controlled substance overdoses to use an electronic-based system.” [82]. This provision likely was intended to have the CDC correct the present flawed system for coding causes of death related to drug overdoses before the next update of the ICD, an all-electronic online version, expected to debut in January 2022 [83].

The Act also mandated the reinstatement of the Drug Abuse Warning Network (DAWN), a retrospective survey of drug-related hospital admissions that inexplicably was halted by SAMHSA at the height of the opioid abuse crisis in 2011 [82]. Well into two years since these important improvements were statutorily ordered by Congress, neither is yet functional (although a contract to reinstitute the DAWN program was awarded in November 2018 to Westat Inc. (Rockville, MA), its former vendor [84]). The Department of Health and Human Services, the parent agency for the CDC and SAMHSA, has opted instead to provide grants to state agencies to perform tasks assigned by federal law to the CDC, namely, to compile drug-involved mortality statistics with a greater emphasis on expanding the specificity and characteristics of drug-involved overdose deaths. Thus far, the CDC has recruited and funded about 47 states to provide this information that the CDC gathers, reformats, and publishes under its own rubric [72].

Why the CDC ignored for years clear signals that its methodology for calculating prescription opioid overdose deaths was flawed is unknown. It seems like, even today, the CDC has no way of determining the actual number of prescription opioid overdose deaths each year. For more than a decade, the CDC’s erroneous reports of prescription opioid overdose deaths went unchallenged while being used by Congress and the Executive Branch as the justification for public policy. In just nine years, from 2012 to 2020, the federal government expended $261.3 billion for drug control [85]. It is estimated that the states spent at least as much, if not more, for the same purpose. The full effect of the CDC’s reporting failures as discussed herein may never be known. What is known is that the amount of money spent on drug control in the US has continued to increase along with the magnitude of the problem. An improved system that is responsive and accurate would likely produce better results. Moreover, it would generate less confounding scientific literature, which most of the time is based on US official data.

It should be noted that in 2021 (beginning October 1, 2020), CMS finalized clinical modifications to specifically identify poisonings by fentanyl or fentanyl analogs within the T40.4 coding category [86]. The same treatment was applied to poisonings by tramadol [86]. Unfortunately, these changes did nothing to remedy the IMF problem because they did not offer a specific coding definition for distinguishing illicit from licit fentanyl. Actually, they were responsible for misinformation appearing in the White House report [87]. Definitely, it is a difficult problem to fix.

Limitations

This narrative review has several limitations. Amongst others, the US situation, which was described in detail, was not compared with reports from the rest of the world. As previously stated, the huge majority of the scientific literature on this topic derives from US official data. The 117 nations that use the ICD for reporting mortality may experience similar limitations in the coding of drug-involved deaths. The CDC’s problem directly results from its use of the ICD codes to categorize drug-involved mortality. Presumably, any other country presently using the same ICD system and encountering counterfeit opioids or benzodiazepines (mostly alprazolam), or using methadone for opiate addiction treatment by administration/dispensing-only (not by prescription except for pain treatment) – would obviously encounter the same problems as the CDC unless, that is, they used more sensitive reporting elements to properly identify drug deaths by specific drugs rather than general categories. The CDC has begun to do this but only from about 2016 when it discovered the error caused by including IMF in its compilation of prescription opioid overdose deaths. Considering that in other countries too, the official data are prevalently based on ICD, it would be important (and interesting) to compare most of the aspects of the cross-pollination, and its influence on the local political and social choices.

Conclusions

The CDC’s problems in reporting drug-involved mortality begin with the source data. Drug-involved overdose deaths pose a unique problem for medical examiners and coroners because of the unavoidable delay in receiving postmortem toxicology results. We found that this problem is not unique to drug overdose deaths, and problems involving deaths caused by other causes/diseases affecting the accuracy of death certificates are also common. The recent pandemic has raised additional questions as to how nations interpret WHO guidelines in recording COVID-19 mortality. 

Why it took more than a decade and several problems before the CDC was finally called to task to answer questions about the issues addressed in this paper is not yet entirely clear. The CDC’s solution for addressing the IMF problem was not a solution at all but simply a way to produce a smaller inaccurate number. Prescription drug abuse remains a national crisis and prescription opioids taken for non-therapeutic purposes contribute to tens of thousands of overdose deaths every year. Reducing drug-involved mortality will likely elude us until we have trustworthy systems that provide reliable data unobscured by antiquated algorithms and codes better suited to conditions of a bygone era.


CDC: won’t let FACTS interfere with a agenda narrative ?

CDC Admits It Has No Record of an Unvaccinated Person Spreading Covid After Recovering From Covid

https://www.thegatewaypundit.com/2021/11/cdc-admits-no-record-unvaccinated-person-spreading-covid-recovering-covid/

Lawyers smell blood in the water.

The CDC admitted it has no record of an unvaccinated person spreading Covid after recovering from Covid in response to an attorney’s FOIA request.

A New York attorney filed a FOIA request in September asking for “documents reflecting any documented case of an individual who (1) never received a Covid-19 vaccine; (2) was infected with Covid-19 once, recovered, and then later became infected again; and (3) transmitted SARS CoV-2 to another person when reinfected.”

The CDC responded: “A search of our records failed to reveal any documents pertaining to your request. The CDC Emergency Operation Center (EOC) conveyed that this information is not collected.”

TRENDING: HORROR: Four Young Soccer Stars from Four Different Countries Die This Week After Suffering Sudden Heart Attacks

A study examining T cell responses in Covid-19 convalescent individuals published earlier this year revealed natural immunity provides better protection against the China virus than vaccination.

Natural immunity doesn’t make Big Pharma any money which is why the Biden Regime and the CDC never talk about it.

USA Healthcare: Nothing more … nothing less than a FOR PROFIT BUSINESS ?

‘Get that money!’ Dermatologist says patient care suffered after private equity-backed firm bought her practice

https://www.nbcnews.com/health/health-care/get-money-dermatologist-says-patient-care-suffered-private-equity-back-rcna9152

A former doctor at a private equity-owned dermatology chain alleges lost biopsies, overbooking and questionable quality control in the company-owned lab.

The email to the health care workers was like something out of “The Wolf of Wall Street.” “We are in the last few days of the month and are only 217 appointments away from meeting our budget,” the August 2020 memo stated. “Don’t forget the August bonus incentive for all patients scheduled in August! That’s the easiest money you can make. Get that money!!”

The “Get that money!!” entreaty wasn’t addressed to a bunch of hard-charging, coke-snorting stockbrokers. It went to Michigan-based employees of Pinnacle Dermatology, a private equity-owned group of 90 dermatology practices across America.

The memo was shared with NBC News by a former Pinnacle employee, Dr. Allison Brown, a board-certified dermatologist and dermatopathologist. Brown says Pinnacle terminated her shortly after she advised management of questionable practices that she contends were hurting patients. 

Among the practices Brown alleges: overlooked diagnoses, lost patient biopsies, questionable quality control in the company-owned lab and overbooking of patients without sufficient support staff.

Physicians have a duty to put their patients’ interests first. But when aggressive financiers take over medical operations, the push for profits can take precedence, doctors in an array of specialties have told NBC News. Paying bonuses for increased patient visits may result in unnecessary appointments and costs, for example.

Among the most aggressive health care financiers in the market today are private equity firms. The new titans of finance, these firms have taken over broad swaths of U.S. industry in recent years. Using large amounts of debt to finance their acquisitions, private equity firms acquire companies, aim to increase their profits and then try to resell them a few years later for more than they paid.

Outside investors, such as public pension funds and endowments, commit big money to the deals in hope of generating high returns.

Private equity is reshaping the health care industry, practitioners, economists and academic researchers contend. Private equity funds dedicated solely to health care operations have been especially busy, raising $350 billion from investors over the past decade, according to Preqin, a private equity data source. Last year, almost $50 billion was raised from investors for health care buyouts, up from $8 billion in 2010.

A focal point in such takeovers has been physician-owned dermatology practices, a highly fragmented sector of small operations that private equity firms have considered ripe for consolidation over the past decade. Just before the pandemic, researchers counted more than 30 private equity-backed dermatology groups in the country and said about 15 percent of dermatology practices were private equity-owned. The number has probably grown, the researchers say.  

Private equity firms contend that they create jobs, support businesses and help provide comfortable retirements for pensioners invested in the strategy. But many outside the industry are especially critical of the industry’s involvement in health care. One private equity-owned hospital staffing company, for example, was behind many of the surprise emergency department bills that outraged hospital patients and resulted in a new law to curb the practices. It takes effect next month. 

“The private equity business model is fundamentally incompatible with sound health care that serves patients,” concluded a paper in May co-authored by Richard M. Scheffler, professor of health economics and public policy at the University of California, Berkeley; Laura M. Alexander, the vice president of policy at the American Antitrust Institute, a nonprofit organization; and James R. Godwin, a Ph.D. candidate at the UCLA Fielding School of Public Health.

The researchers found that private equity’s focus on short-term profits “leads to pressure to prioritize revenue over quality of care, to overburden health-care companies with debt, strip their assets, and put them at risk of long-term failure, and to engage in anticompetitive and unethical billing practices.”

In addition, economists and practitioners who have studied private equity-backed health care entities say they often try to increase revenue by providing services typically outsourced to third parties. For example, many dermatology practices backed by private equity acquire their own labs to analyze specimens. They can be a source of additional revenue, research shows, and may provide incentives for the practices to run extra tests, presenting possible conflicts of interest.

Pinnacle Dermatology, which is based in Brentwood, Tennessee, and operates in 11 states, has been buying small physician-owned practices and outpatient services. 

Dr. Jose Rios, Pinnacle’s president and chief medical officer, provided the following statement: “Our top priorities are always patient safety and clinical quality. Pinnacle Dermatology’s compliance and quality assurance programs lead the industry. We are proud of our track record, our high levels of patient satisfaction and the equally high patient loyalty that results and will continue to provide valuable dermatological care at the highest possible levels.”

Backing Pinnacle is Chicago Pacific Capital, a private equity firm founded in 2014. The firm “invests in companies that it believes are positioned to lead innovations in health-care delivery and in caring for aging populations,” a regulatory filing says. Chicago Pacific had $1.8 billion under management, including borrowings, as of December 2020.

Chicago Pacific didn’t respond to a phone call and a detailed email seeking comment about Pinnacle. 

Brown, the former Pinnacle physician, who has also taught dermatology at two medical schools, said she decided to share her experience at the company out of concern for patient safety. “I worked in an office that was physician-owned until the physician passed away and we were bought out,” Brown said. “I experienced from the inside what happened to the practice” after private equity arrived.  

Among the changes Brown said she saw after Pinnacle took over were an increase in patient biopsies that got lost and a drop in the quality and number of instruments purchased for the practice. She said the office booked her for 40 patient appointments a day without adequate support staff. Brown also described cases of patients were seen multiple times for problems that could have been resolved in single visits, raising the patients’ costs.

Brown says that when private equity firms take over health care practices, it hurts the quality of health care and is bad for patients.
Brown says that when private equity firms take over health care practices, it hurts the quality of health care and is bad for patients. Sarah Rice for NBC News

Even worse, Brown said, patient diagnoses fell through the cracks; for months, the office didn’t follow through on treating a patient’s melanoma, for example. “If you miss a melanoma and you’re not being treated, there could be significant morbidity and mortality with that,” she said.

A letter Brown’s lawyer sent to Pinnacle in the fall of 2020 and reviewed by NBC News detailed her criticisms. Shortly after the letter went out, Brown was let go.

The company contended that she had behaved unethically, Brown said, but she said she and her lawyer obtained her personnel file and found nothing in it to support the claim. “They started targeting me,” Brown said. “They weren’t happy with me sending emails up the chain about stuff going wrong.”

THE LONDON BRIEF: DEA REPRESENTS A CRIMINAL ORGANIZATION, BLAMING PHYSICIANS AND PHARMACIST EXPOSES THEIR BIG LIE

THE LONDON BRIEF: DEA REPRESENTS A CRIMINAL ORGANIZATION, BLAMING PHYSICIANS AND PHARMACIST EXPOSES THEIR BIG LIE

https://youarewithinthenorms.com/2021/12/25/the-london-brief-dea-represents-a-criminal-organization-blaming-physicians-and-pharmacist-exposes-their-big-lie/

NORMAN J CLEMENT RPH., DDS, NORMAN L.CLEMENT PHARM-TECH, MALACHI F. MACKANDAL PHARMD, BELINDA BROWN-PARKER, IN THE SPIRIT OF JOSEPH SOLVO ESQ., INC.T. SPIRIT OF REV. C.T. VIVIAN, JELANI ZIMBABWE CLEMENT, BS., MBA., IN THE SPIRIT OF THE HON. PATRICE LUMUMBA, IN THE SPIRIT OF ERLIN CLEMENT SR., WALTER F. WRENN III., MD., JULIE KILLINGWORTH, LESLY POMPY MD., NANCY SEEFELDT, WILLIE GUINYARD BS., JOSEPH WEBSTER MD., MBA, BEVERLY C. PRINCE MD., FACS., NEIL ARNAND, MD., RICHARD KAUL, MD., LEROY BAYLOR, JAY K. JOSHI MD., MBA, ADRIENNE EDMUNDSON, ESTER HYATT PH.D., WALTER L. SMITH BS., IN THE SPIRIT OF BRAHM FISHER ESQ., MICHELE ALEXANDER MD., CUDJOE WILDING BS, MARTIN NJOKU, BS., RPH., IN THE SPIRIT OF DEBRA LYNN SHEPHERD, BERES E. MUSCHETT, STRATEGIC ADVISORS

EXCERPTS FROM THE LONDON BRIEF AND BEYOND

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“Pain is real and acute pain left untreated leads to very serious, complications when left resulting in organ failure and death”

THE DEA REPRESENTS A CRIMINAL GANG CARTEL OF U.S. GOVERNMENT

From YWTN;

The DEA represents a criminal organization. Their main goals are to create rules and regulations that support and satisfy their internal ambitions. Like any gang, the main ambition is to create rules and regulations to support the organizational goals.
When examining an organization like the DEA we have seen over the years members of the DEA working directly with the drug cartel. This can only be possible with knowledge management and supervision.

  1. With the vast amounts of money within the drug world, what part of the organization is not compromised?  


In an article published January 14, 2014, in the American Thinker “DEA working with drug cartel for more than a decade” By Rick Moran:


“The Drug Enforcement Agency had a secret arrangement with the notorious Sinaloa cartel “that allowed the organization to smuggle billions of dollars of drugs while Sinaloa provided information on rival cartels.” Sinaloa, led by Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman, supplies 80% of the drugs entering the Chicago area and has a presence in cities across the U.S.

There have long been allegations that Guzman, considered to be “the world’s most powerful drug trafficker,” coordinates with American authorities.”
It can plainly be seen that the DEA is operating as a corporate corrupted organization.  Whenever an organization operates without defined checks and balances, the operating alone under the guidance of deception.

When the governmental agency develops probable cause based on a GOOGLE search, such contrived rationale that a crime or sets of crimes were committed were not challenged by upper management and or the courts.

Yet, there are no reasonable rational thoughts of criminal justice criminal acts to support the DEA accusations.
We challenge any DEA agent to step forward and speak the truths before any criminal investigation is started before the entire organization is shut down and multiple agents and supervisors are sent to prison.”

J2426: VIDEO TESTIMONY OF DR. BRUCE BAGLEY OKLAHOMA TRIAL 2019 DEA-DOJ AND WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY KNEW ROUTES OF CARTELS AS FAR BACK AS 2005

From Criminal Law Cathleen London MD., DOJ Overreach Prosecuting Physicians December 20, 2021:

DON’T CROSS MEDICAL SCIENCE

“Reducing opioid prescriptions has not reduced opioid deaths, rather they have skyrocketed. Prescription opioid deaths have been stable since 2010 but the DOJ continues to use the same playbook. “The DOJ is aggressively fulfilling its vow to use every criminal, civil and regulatory tool possible to target, prosecute and shut down entities whose conduct it deems unlawful.

Some of the tactics used are the same as used with drug kingpins like El Chapo. Prosecutors approach the medical staff and patients in a doctor’s office and threaten that they will be co-defendants if they do not testify against the physician.

They are then pressured to give misleading testimony. In more than one case, Dr. Bamdad and Dr. Henson for example, a patient committed suicide with prescribed opioids, and the physician was blamed for the death and sentenced accordingly.

The DOJ accused him of being a ‘pill mill’ as he was one of the state’s highest prescribers. Data analytics are driving investigations and prosecutions even though the algorithms are faulty. 

DANTE’S INFERNO IS A SPECIAL PLACE IN HELL GUARDED BY MALEBRANCHE DEMONS ”EVIL CLAWS”

The DOJ counts on the vague definition in the CSA of “legitimate medical purpose” to prosecute, even though agents admit they do not know what that is. The government uses this legal ambiguity to their advantage and the result is policing and terrorizing physicians.

Blaming physicians for a patient overdosing on their prescription opioids is like blaming a car dealership for a motor vehicle accident.”

TAMPA ATTORNEY SAYS, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH OFFICIALS (ARE ON RECORD)STATING DEA IS TARGETTING BLACK OWN PHARMACIES AND PHARMACISTS FORCING THEM OUT OF BUSINESS EVEN THOUGH THEY HAVE DONE NOTHING WRONG”

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According Felix Brizuela D.O. Neurologist of Western Pennsylvania in a report called:   “The Sad Truth in Healthcare Chronic Pain itself leads to cardiovascular diseases leading to premature death,”

Felix and Son

“Chronic pain itself leads to cardiovascular disease leading to premature death.  Brizuela points to an article in JAMA (October 2021) confirmed this after a ten-year, over one million patients study. “

In 2005 Ronald T. Libby, a Ph.D. fellow of the Cato Institute wrote in: “Treating Doctors as Drug Dealers: The DEA;s War on Prescription Painkillers,”

Untreated pain is a serious problem in the United States. Given the difficulties in measuring a condition that’s untreated, estimates vary, but most experts agree that tens of millions of Americans suffer from undertreated or untreated pain. The Society for Neuroscience, the largest organization of brain researchers, estimates that 100 million Americans suffer from chronic pain. 

The American Pain Foundation, a professional organization of pain specialists, puts the number at 75 million—50 million from serious chronic pain (pain lasting six months or more), and an additional 25 million from acute pain caused by accidents, surgeries, and injuries. The societal costs associated with untreated and undertreated pain are substantial. In addition to the obvious cost of needless suffering, damages include broken marriages, alcoholism and family violence, absenteeism and job loss, depression, and suicide.

DR. XIULU RUAN VS. UNITED STATES CASE BEFORE SUPREME COURT Nos. 20-1410 & 21-5261

The American Pain Society, another professional group, estimates that in 1995 untreated pain cost American business more than $100 billion in medical expenses, lost wages, and other costs, including 50 million workdays.3 A 2003 article in the Journal of the American Medical Association puts the economic impact of common ailments alone—such as arthritis, back pain, and headache—at $61.2 billion per year.4

Chronic pain can be brought on by a wide range of illnesses, including cancer, lower back disorders, rheumatoid arthritis, shingles, post-surgical pain, fibromyalgia, sickle cell anemia, diabetes, HIV/AIDS, migraine and cluster headaches, pain from broken bones, sports injuries, and other trauma.” 

CONGRESS MUST STOP FAILING

W. CLEMENT, INTRACTABLE PAIN PATIENT
PHARMACIST STEVE ARIENS
BOB SHEERIN, ADPF

THE PEOPLE AND MEDICAL

GLINDA FINCHER, SICKLE CELL

HEALTHCARE AND CLEAN UP THIS MESS

J.KILLINGSWORTH

FOR NOW, YOU ARE WITHIN

YOUAREWITHINTHENORMS.COM,(WYNTON MARSALIS CONCERTO FOR TRUMPET AND 2 OBOES, 1984)

THE NORMS

1. Carl T. Hall, “Living in Pain Addiction,” San Francisco Chronicle, April 5, 1999, p. A1.

2. American Pain Foundation, “Voices of People

The DEA’s renewed war on pain doctors has frightened many physicians
out of pain management altogether, exacerbating an already serious health crisis—the widespread undertreatment of intractable pain. with Pain,” http://www.painfoundation.org/page .asp?menu=1&item=3&file=voices/intro.htm.

3. American Pain Foundation, “Talking Points on Pain,” AMNews, September 23–30, 2002, p.1, http: //www.painfoundation.org/print.asp?file=PCPA2 003_Points.htm.

4. Walter F. Stewart et al., “Lost Productive Time and Cost Due to Common Pain Conditions in the US Workforce,” Journal of the American Medical Association 290 (2003): 2443–54. 

Thank You, I ask you to donate to the Pharmacist For Healthcare Legal  Defense Fund, fight the DEA attack on me & Pronto Pharmacy now Gulf Med Pharmacy our goal 100k, Appeal Court 1st Dist Wash DC. 
Click to Donate:  http://gf.me/u/2qffp4 #GoFundMe or cash app: $docnorm 
or to Zelle: 3135103378

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If it can happen to me, it can happen to you. IT’S HAPPENING TO YOU RIGHT NOW!

CVS Worker has heart attack “NOT ALLOWED” to leave until replacement shows | #PizzaIsNotWorking

CVS Worker has heart attack “NOT ALLOWED” to leave until replacement shows | #PizzaIsNotWorking

DEA’s GESTAPO ACTIONS COME BEFORE SUPREME COURT: IN RUAN Vs. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; Case No. 20-1410 (AMICUS CURIAE)

DEA’s GESTAPO ACTIONS COME BEFORE SUPREME COURT: IN RUAN Vs. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; Case No. 20-1410 (AMICUS CURIAE)

https://youarewithinthenorms.com/2021/12/23/deas-gestapo-actions-come-before-supreme-court-in-ruan-vs-united-states-of-america-case-no-20-1410-amicus-curiae/

https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/20/20-1410/206008/20211221171958659_Ruan — AC Brief – U.S. Supreme Court FINAL.pdf

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

____________________

XIULU RUAN,

v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

____________________

On Writ of Certiorari
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit ____________________

BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF PACIFIC LEGAL FOUNDATION IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER___________

CALEB KRUCKENBERG JOHN F. KERKHOFF Pacific Legal Foundation 3100 Clarendon Blvd Suite 610

Counsel for Amicus Curiae Pacific Legal Foundation

Arlington, VA 22201
Telephone: 202.888.6881
CKruckenberg@pacificlegal.org ODunford@pacificlegal.org JKerkhoff@pacificlegal.org

OLIVER J. DUNFORD

Counsel of Record

Pacific Legal Foundation 4440 PGA Blvd., Suite 307 Palm Beach Gardens, FL 33410

Telephone: (916) 503.9060

Petitioner,page1image3202594656page1image3202594944

i

Table of Contents

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ……………………………….. iii

IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF AMICUS
CURIAE ……………………………………………………………. 1

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ……………………………………………………… 2

ARGUMENT ……………………………………………………… 3

  1. CONGRESS PROHIBITED PRESCRIBING A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE ONLY WHEN DONE WITH KNOWLEDGE THAT THE PRESCRIPTION WAS ISSUED OUTSIDE THE COURSE OF PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE………………………………………………… 3
  2. ALLOWING CONVICTIONS FOR MERE DEPARTURES FROM PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE, REGARDLESS OF A PHYSICIAN’S INTENT, WOULD JEOPARDIZE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONs …………………………………………. 6
    1. The Statute Requires Knowledge of Wrongdoing ………………………………………….. 6
    2. Only Congress May Create a New Criminal Offense; Allowing DEA To Do So Violates the Non-Delegation Doctrine …………………. 8
    3. Due Process Forbids Criminalizing Good Faith Efforts To Comply With the CSA …. 13
    4. The Rule of Lenity Was Designed To Prevent These Constitutional Problems … 16

ii CONCLUSION…………………………………………………. 19

Cases

A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States,

iii

Table of Authorities

Page(s)

295 U.S. 495 (1935) …………………………………….10

Abramski v. United States,
573 U.S. 169 (2014) …………………………………….19

Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp.,
488 U.S. 204 (1988) ………………………………………8

Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def.
Council, Inc.,

467 U.S. 837 (1984) ………………………………………8

Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf
Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council,

485 U.S. 568 (1988) ………………………………………9

Elonis v. United States,
575 U.S. 723 (2015) ………………………….14, 15, 16

Guedes v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms & Explosives,

140 S. Ct. 789 (2020) …………………………………..18

Gundy v. United States,
__ U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 2116 (2019)…..9, 10, 12, 13

Lambert v. People of the State of California,
355 U.S. 225 (1957) …………………………………….14

iv
471 U.S. 419 (1985) ………………………9, 13, 17, 18

Liparota v. United States, Lucia v. SEC,

138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018) …………………………………..1

McBoyle v. United States,
283 U.S. 25 (1931) ………………………………………17

Mistretta v. United States,
488 U.S. 361 (1989) ………………………………………9

Morissette v. United States,
342 U.S. 246 (1952) ………………………….14, 15, 16

Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan,
293 U.S. 388 (1935) ………………………………………9

Paul v. United States,
__ U.S. __, 140 S. Ct. 342 (2019) …………………..10

People ex rel. Price v. Sheffield Farms- Slawson-Decker Co., 225 N.Y. 25, 32–33
(1918) ……………………………………………………….15

Rapanos v. United States,
547 U.S. 715 (2006) ………………………………………1

Sackett v. EPA,
566 U.S. 120 (2012) ………………………………………1

Touby v. United States,
500 U.S. 160 (1991) …………………………………….12

U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs v. Hawkes Co., Inc.,

136 S. Ct. 1807 (2016) …………………………………..1

v
571 U.S. 359 (2014) …………………………………….19

United States v. Apel, United States v. Bass,

404 U.S. 336 (1971) …………………………………….17

United States v. Eaton,
144 U.S. 677 (1892) …………………………………….11

United States v. Guerrero,
650 F.2d 728 (5th Cir. 1981) ………………………….7

United States v. Hurwitz,
459 F.3d 463 (4th Cir. 2006) ………………………….7

United States v. Joseph,
709 F.3d 1082 (11th Cir. 2013) ………………………7

United States v. Moore,
423 U.S. 122 (1975) …………………………………..4, 6

United States v. Nasir,
17 F.4th 459 (3d Cir. 2021) …………………….17, 18

United States v. Phifer,
909 F.3d 372 (11th Cir. 2018) ………………………18

United States v. Santos,
553 U.S. 507 (2008) …………………………………….17

United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co.,
438 U.S. 422 (1978) ……………………………….15, 16

United States v. Wiltberger,
18 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 76 (1820) ………………………..17

vi

Wayman v. Southard,
23 U.S. 1 (1825) ………………………………………….11

Statutes

§ 802(21) ……………………………………………4 § 822(b) ……………………………………………..4 § 829(a) ……………………………………………..3 § 841(a)(1)……………………………3, 7, 12, 16 §§ 842(a), 843(a) …………………………………4 § 871(a), (b)………………………………………..5

21 U.S.C.
21 U.S.C.
21 U.S.C.
21 U.S.C.
21 U.S.C.
21 U.S.C.
Regulations
21 C.F.R. § 1306.04……………………………………………5 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a)…………………………………….5, 7

1

IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE 1

Founded in 1973, Pacific Legal Foundation is a nonprofit, tax-exempt, California corporation established for the purpose of litigating matters affecting the public interest. PLF provides a voice in the courts for Americans who believe in limited constitutional government, private property rights, and individual freedom.

PLF is the most experienced public-interest legal organization defending the constitutional principle of separation of powers in the arena of administrative law. PLF’s attorneys have participated as lead counsel in several cases involving the role of the Judicial Branch as an independent check on the Executive and Legislative branches under the Constitution’s Separation of Powers. See U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs v. Hawkes Co., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1807 (2016) (judicial review of agency interpretation of Clean Water Act); Sackett v. EPA, 566 U.S. 120 (2012) (same); Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006) (agency regulations defining “waters of the United States”). It also regularly participates in this Court as amici. See, e.g., Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018)

1 After timely notice was given, counsel for all parties have consented to the filing of this brief. Pursuant to Rule 37.6, Amicus Curiae affirms that no counsel for any party authored this brief in whole or in part, and no counsel or party made a monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission of this brief. No person other than Amicus Curiae, its members, or its counsel made a monetary contribution to its preparation or submission.page8image3310210768

2

(SEC administrative-law judge is “officer of the United States” under the Appointments Clause).

This case addresses the role that an administrative agency has in creating a federal criminal offense. The decision under review allowed a prosecutorial agency to define a criminal offense, and even create criminal liability without an element of the defendant’s knowledge of wrongdoing. PLF, therefore, writes separately to explain how the result below threatens the separation of powers and defies core precepts of due process.

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Dr. Xiulu Ruan was convicted of overprescribing controlled substances outside the usual course of medical practice and was sentenced to more than 20 years in federal prison. But as the lower court held, to obtain this extraordinary prison sentence, the government never had to prove that Dr. Ruan was aware that he failed to live up to the prevailing standard of care.

That analysis botches the statutory text (as Dr. Ruan argues). But it also threatens important constitutional norms. The question dividing the courts of appeal centers not on statutory text, but on a regulation issued by the Drug Enforcement Agency, an arm of the same Department of Justice prosecuting Dr. Ruan. Through that regulation, DEA created criminal liability where there was none before, by eliminating any requirement that a physician be aware that his conduct departs from professional

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practice. Congress cannot (and did not) delegate such lawmaking authority to an agency, and, even if it could, due process requires more notice to a criminal defendant before he can be imprisoned for decades. That constitutional requirement means that statutory text permits only one outcome—reading the statute to prohibit only knowing departures from acceptable standards of practice. A DEA regulation cannot supplant statutory text and due process.

ARGUMENT

I. CONGRESS PROHIBITED PRESCRIBING A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE ONLY WHEN DONE WITH KNOWLEDGE THAT THE PRESCRIPTION WAS ISSUED OUTSIDE THE COURSE OF PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE

The Controlled Substances Act makes it unlawful “except as authorized” by the DEA, to “knowingly or intentionally” “distribute, or dispense” “a controlled substance.” 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). To ensure that this prohibition encompassed the practice of medicine, Congress also provided that “no controlled substance . . . may be dispensed without the written prescription of a practitioner.” 21 U.S.C. § 829(a) (Schedule II substances). And stating the opposite, Congress said that “[p]ersons registered by the Attorney General” “to distribute or dispense controlled substances” “are authorized” to do so, “to the extent authorized by their registration and in

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conformity with the other provisions of” the CSA. 21 U.S.C. § 822(b).2

“Section 822(b) defines the scope of authorization under the Act in circular terms” though. Moore, 423 U.S. at 140. But, according to this Court, “the scheme of the statute, viewed against the background of the legislative history, reveals an intent to limit a registered physician’s dispensing authority to the course of his ‘professional practice.” Id. Congress defined the term “practitioner,” who is forbidden to dispense controlled substances without a prescription under Section 829, to mean “a physician … permitted, by the United States or the jurisdiction in which he practices or does research, to distribute, dispense, conduct research with respect to, administer, or use in teaching or chemical analysis, a controlled substance in the course of professional practice or research.” 21 U.S.C. § 802(21) (emphasis added).

Congress stopped there, however, and left it up to the DEA to figure out exactly when, and how, medical practitioners could dispense controlled substances “in the course of professional practice.” Congress provided simply that the “Attorney General may promulgate and enforce any rules, regulations,

2 Congress also criminalized distribution or dispensing of controlled substances by a “registrant” when “not authorized by his registration” or without an appropriate order form. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 842(a), 843(a). These offenses came with lesser penalties than Section 841, and this Court has held that they do not displace liability under Section 841 for physicians who dispense controlled substances. United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122, 137 (1975).page11image3310931152

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and procedures which he may deem necessary and appropriate for the efficient execution of” the CSA, and the Attorney General was also authorized to “delegate any of his functions under this subchapter to any officer or employee of the Department of Justice.” 21 U.S.C. § 871(a), (b).

The DEA, acting on this delegation provision, promulgated 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04. That regulation says that either a “prescribing practitioner” or “the pharmacist who fills the prescription” “shall be subject to the penalties provided for violations of the provisions of law relating to controlled substances” when the prescription was “issued not in the usual course of professional treatment or in legitimate and authorized research” or “issued for a legitimate medical purpose.” Id. at § 1306.04(a). The regulation is silent concerning good faith, or any mens rea concerning the course of professional practice, but instead attaches liability merely for “knowingly filling” a prescription issued outside the course of professional practice. Id.

As Dr. Ruan notes, the interpretation of that regulation started the Circuits down multiple, conflicting, and often internally inconsistent paths. PLF agrees with Dr. Ruan that the Eleventh Circuit’s strict-liability approach cannot be reconciled with the regulation. Indeed, Dr. Ruan was convicted based on an instruction saying that “a medical doctor has violated section 841 when the government has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the doctor’s actions were either not for a legitimate medical purpose or were outside the usual course of professional medical practice.” App. App’x at 139a. This says nothing about

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the need for Dr. Ruan to knowingly depart from professional practice, and it did not consider Dr. Ruan’s subjective good faith. Id. Yet this Court previously approved an instruction saying that a defendant “could not be convicted if he merely made ‘an honest effort’ to prescribe … in compliance with an accepted standard of medical practice,” so the Eleventh Circuit’s approach was wrong. See Moore, 423 U.S. at 142 n.20.

II. ALLOWING CONVICTIONS FOR MERE DEPARTURES FROM PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE, REGARDLESS OF A PHYSICIAN’S INTENT, WOULD JEOPARDIZE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS

Aside from simply misreading the statute, the Eleventh Circuit’s approach raises more fundamental problems. The lower court’s holding would allow DEA to define the bounds of criminal liability in spite of statutory limits. That holding would have DEA define a criminal offense in a vacuum, without any Congressional oversight, and without any respect for constitutional imperatives of fair notice and the separation of powers.

A. The Statute Requires Knowledge of Wrongdoing

The blame for the Eleventh Circuit’s error lies squarely at the feet of DEA, as its regulation purporting to define the scope of criminal liability for physicians is anything but clear. The disagreement over “good faith” actually appears to reflect a much more basic question about what role the statutory

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mens rea requirement serves, as well as what the agency meant when it said that liability arises for “knowingly” filling or issuing a prescription issued outside the course of professional practice. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a).

Recall that the statute prohibits “knowing or intentional” conduct. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Several circuits, including the Eleventh, have noted that the statute and regulation, therefore, require proof that a physician knew the prescription was not issued in the course of professional practice. See, e.g., United States v. Joseph, 709 F.3d 1082, 1094 (11th Cir. 2013) (“To convict a licensed physician under section 841(a)(1), it is incumbent upon the government to prove that he dispensed controlled substances for other than legitimate medical purposes in the usual course of professional practice, and that he did so knowingly and intentionally. And to convict a licensed pharmacist under section 841(a)(1), the government must prove that the pharmacist filled a prescription knowing that a physician issued the prescription without a legitimate medical purpose or outside the usual course of professional practice.”) (citations omitted); United States v. Guerrero, 650 F.2d 728, 730 (5th Cir. 1981) (“To convict Dr. Guerrero, it was incumbent upon the government to prove that he dispensed controlled substances for other than legitimate medical purposes in the usual course of professional practice, and that he did so knowingly and intentionally.”). The good-faith issue arguably diverts from this more basic knowledge requirement. See United States v. Hurwitz, 459 F.3d 463, 475 (4th Cir. 2006) (vacating conviction on other grounds, and not reaching question of whether good

8

faith instruction improperly “required the jury to apply the knowledge requirement only to Hurwitz’s act of writing a prescription, and that the instructions therefore permitted the jury to convict even if it concluded that Hurwitz did not know that any given prescription was not for a legitimate medical purpose or was beyond the bounds of medical practice”).

The DEA cannot, via regulation, displace the statute’s mens rea requirement. “It is axiomatic that an administrative agency’s power to promulgate legislative regulations is limited to the authority delegated by Congress.” Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988). Thus, if “Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue,” “that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). And if the statute requires proof that a physician knew that he acted outside the scope of professional practice, then it also requires that he not act in good faith. After all, if a physician genuinely believed he acted in the course of professional practice, even erroneously, it’s hard to see how he “knew” his conduct was unlawful.

B. Only Congress May Create a New Criminal Offense; Allowing DEA To Do So Violates the Non-Delegation Doctrine

If the statute isn’t clear on this point, though, then much larger problems arise about DEA’s authority. The canon of constitutional avoidance

9

instructs that a court must “construe [a] statute to avoid [serious constitutional] problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress.” Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988). This rule of construction prevails even concerning an ambiguous statute or regulation over which an agency ordinarily would be entitled to interpretive deference. Id. at 574–75.

Article I of the Constitution provides that “[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 1. Moreover, “[t]he definition of the elements of a criminal offense is entrusted to the legislature, particularly in the case of federal crimes, which are solely creatures of statute.” Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 424 (1985). Agencies, therefore, may not exercise Congress’s legislative power to declare “what circumstances … should be forbidden” by criminal laws. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 418–19 (1935).

It’s no secret, however, that this Court has struggled with defining the limits on the legislature’s delegation of its authority. Traditionally the Court has allowed agencies to exercise authority so long as Congress set out an “intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to [exercise the authority] is directed to conform.” Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989). But that test lacks clear contours. Furthermore, five members of the Court have recently expressed interest in at least exploring a reconsideration of that standard. See Gundy v. United States, __ U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2131–42

10

(2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting, joined by Roberts, C.J., and Thomas, J.); id. at 2130–31 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment); Paul v. United States, __ U.S. __, 140 S. Ct. 342 (2019) (mem.) (Kavanaugh, J., statement respecting the denial of certiorari) (stating that the issues raised in the Gundy dissent “may warrant further consideration in future cases”).

Of course, even under the “intelligible principle” standard, this Court has suggested that it would present “a nondelegation question” if a statute provides an agency with “unguided” or “unchecked” authority to define a crime. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2123 (plurality op.). While “administrative” rules implementing a statute are one thing, rules creating a new crime are quite another. See id. at 2129.

Moreover, as Justice Gorsuch recently highlighted in his dissenting opinion in Gundy, a delegation that “purports to endow the nation’s chief prosecutor with the power to write his own criminal code” “scrambles th[e] design” of the Constitution, which “promises that only the people’s elected representatives may adopt new federal laws restricting liberty.” 139 S. Ct. at 2131.

“[W]e know that as long as Congress makes the policy decisions when regulating private conduct, it may authorize another branch to fill up the details.” Id. at 2136. But the opposite is true as well—when Congress leaves policy decisions up to another branch, it unlawfully divests itself of power. See A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 529 (1935). What constitutes a “policy decision[]” was illustrated as far back as 1825, when the Court upheld

11

a statute that instructed the federal courts to borrow state-court procedural rules but allowed them to make certain “alterations and additions.” Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. 1, 1 (1825). Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Marshall distinguished between those “important subjects, which must be entirely regulated by the legislature itself,” and “those of less interest, in which a general provision may be made, and power given to those who are to act … to fill up the details.”Id. at 21.

The Court provided a concrete example of this distinction in United States v. Eaton, 144 U.S. 677 (1892). There, the Court struck down a series of federal tax regulations that purported to impose criminal liability even though Congress had not set out a penalty provision. Id. at 688. As there were “no common-law offenses against the United States,” it was up to Congress to provide criminal punishment for violation of a regulation. Id. at 687. The decision of whether to punish something as a crime could not be wholly delegated to an agency, because “[i]t would be a very dangerous principle” to allow an agency to issue regulations that, themselves, carried criminal penalties under the general rubric of being “a needful regulation” to enforce a statute. Id. at 688. Thus, the Court held that “[i]t is necessary that a sufficient statutory authority should exist for declaring any act or omission a criminal offense,” even if the agency could otherwise issue regulations that had, “in a proper sense, the force of law[.]” Id.

In more recent cases this Court has also questioned whether “something more than an ‘intelligible principle’ is required when Congress

12

authorizes another Branch to promulgate regulations that contemplate criminal sanctions.” Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 165–66 (1991). Indeed, this Court assumed so where it allowed the Attorney General to add a substance to a list of prohibited drugs temporarily if he determined that doing so was “necessary to avoid an imminent hazard to the public safety.” Id. at 166 (1991). But, importantly, the Court blessed the scheme under review in that case because it delegated a fact-finding role, instead of the policy question of whether something should be a crime. See id. As described by Justice Gorsuch, “In approving the statute, the Court stressed all the[] constraints on the Attorney General’s discretion and, in doing so, seemed to indicate that the statute supplied an ‘intelligible principle’ because it assigned an essentially fact- finding responsibility to the executive.” Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2141. This Court must be especially wary, however, when Congress purports to allow an agency to exercise criminal policy-making authority. See id.

If there truly is no conflict between Section 841(a)(1) and DEA’s regulations defining what it means to be “authorized” to prescribe controlled substances, then Congress has impermissibly allowed the Executive Branch to write criminal laws. The delegation is breathtaking—any act of prescribing controlled substances is a federal crime “except as authorized” by DEA. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The default is criminality, abated only by the Attorney General’s good grace—the grace of the prosecutor responsible for enforcing the statute. The statute doesn’t even provide limiting principles or guidance on these questions. Moreover, if, as the court below concluded, DEA responded to this delegation by criminalizing

13

even unwitting departures from professional standards, then Congress’s delegation allowed the prosecution to create a strict liability crime out of nothing. Surely such “unguided” or “unchecked” authority to define a crime presents “a nondelegation question.” See Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2123 (plurality op.). More likely it “scrambles th[e] design” of the Constitution” See id. at 2131 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).

Make no mistake—DEA’s creation of a professional practice offense is an exercise in pure Congressional policymaking. Defining a criminal offense, such as how one is guilty of federal drug offenses, is something that “is entrusted to the legislature.” See Liparota, 471 U.S. at 424. DEA has no authority to create a crime, much less exercise the power to arbitrarily withhold criminal punishment except where it sees fit.

C. Due Process Forbids Criminalizing Good Faith Efforts To Comply With the CSA

Yet another vital constitutional principle dooms DEA’s attempt to create a crime lacking any culpable state of mind. Basics of fair notice would likely prevent Congress from writing a statute criminalizing good faith mistakes by medical professionals. DEA certainly cannot escape that same limit.

“The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted by intention is no provincial or transient notion. It is as universal and persistent in mature systems of law as belief in freedom of the

14

human will and a consequent ability and duty of the normal individual to choose between good and evil.” Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952). Thus, “mere omission from [a statute] of any mention of intent will not be construed as eliminating that element from the crimes denounced.” Id. at 263. “This rule of construction reflects the basic principle that wrongdoing must be conscious to be criminal.” Elonis v. United States, 575 U.S. 723, 734 (2015) (citation omitted).

Thus, strict liability here might violate due process. “Engrained in our concept of due process is the requirement of notice. Notice is sometimes essential so that the citizen has the chance to defend charges.” Lambert v. People of the State of California, 355 U.S. 225, 228 (1957). If a person is not aware that his conduct is forbidden, and has no ability to learn so, due process bars “the imposition of heavy criminal penalties.” Id. at 230 “Were it otherwise, the evil would be as great as it is when the law is written in print too fine to read or in a language foreign to the community.” Id.

The need for a presumption of mens rea also maintains the separation of powers, which are critical to ensuring liberty. “The spirit of the doctrine which denies to the federal judiciary power to create crimes forthrightly admonishes that we should not enlarge the reach of enacted crimes by constituting them from anything less than the incriminating components contemplated by the words used in the statute.” Morissette, 342 U.S. at 263.

15

To be sure, this Court has noted that a “limited class” of strict liability “offenses against [] statutory regulations” might comport with constitutional limits. Id. at 258. But it has also stressed that this exception applies only when such offenses “were punishable only by fine moderate in amount,” and “in sustaining the power so to fine unintended violations we are not to be understood as sustaining to a like length the power to imprison.” Id. at 257–58 (quoting People ex rel. Price v. Sheffield Farms-Slawson-Decker Co., 225 N.Y. 25, 32–33 (1918)). Thus, in a case where a regulatory offense also came with the possibility of a penalty of up to three years’ imprisonment, this Court refused to expose “a good-faith error of judgment” to criminal punishment. United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 442 (1978). Otherwise, the “criminal sanctions would be used, not to punish conscious and calculated wrongdoing at odds with statutory proscriptions, but instead simply to regulate business practices regardless of the intent with which they were undertaken.” Id. (emphasis in original).

The lower court’s interpretation of the statute threatens these constitutional protections. Dr. Ruan faced prosecution regardless of his subjective good faith, based only on an objective standard of whether he departed, even unwittingly, from professional practice. Such an objective standard is “inconsistent with the conventional requirement for criminal conduct—awareness of some wrongdoing.” See Elonis, 575 U.S. at 738 (citation omitted). Liability based on an abstract notion of the correct standard of care— “regardless of what the defendant thinks—reduces culpability on the all-important element of the crime to negligence, and we have long been reluctant to infer

16

that a negligence standard was intended in criminal statutes.” Id. (citations omitted). How could Dr. Ruan have fair notice of his offense if he lacked any opportunity to “choose between good and evil?” See Morissette, 342 U.S. at 250. Moreover, allowing DEA to “enlarge the reach of [the] enacted crimes” in Section 841(a)(1) in such a way, doubly frustrates the guarantees protected by the separation of powers. See id. at 263.

It is also no excuse for DEA to claim that this is a “regulatory” offense. Dr. Ruan was sentenced to more than 20 years in federal prison for violating Section 841(a)(1), which is the main authority for all types of drug federal prosecutions. Dr. Ruan clearly did not suffer a “fine moderate in amount,” for his offense. See id. at 257–58. Nor was he prosecuted under a limited regulatory regime. See id. If the regulation omits a knowledge requirement, then the harsh punishments set out by the CSA would simply regulate the medical profession through the threat of arbitrary punishment. See U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. at 442.

D. The Rule of Lenity Was Designed To Prevent These Constitutional Problems

This Court has long used a tool of statutory construction to avoid the precise constitutional problems discussed above—the rule of lenity. It should use that rule again now and reject DEA’s effort to create a new strict liability offense in the absence of Congressional direction.

17

“[R]equiring mens rea is in keeping with our longstanding recognition of the principle that ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity.” Liparota, 471 U.S. at 427 (citation omitted). The rule of lenity is a tool of construction “perhaps not much less old than construction itself.” United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 76, 95 (1820). In simple terms, “lenity requires ambiguous criminal laws to be interpreted in favor of the defendants subjected to them.” United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 514 (2008). Three “core values of the Republic” underlie the rule of lenity: (1) due process; (2) the separation of governmental powers; and (3) “our nation’s strong preference for liberty.” United States v. Nasir, 17 F.4th 459, 473 (3d Cir. 2021) (en banc) (Bibas, J., concurring).

Due process requires that “a fair warning should be given to the world in language that the common world will understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed. To make the warning fair, so far as possible the line should be clear.” McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931). By construing ambiguities in the defendant’s favor, lenity prohibits criminal consequences when Congress did not provide a fair warning through clear statutory language. Id.

Lenity also protects the freedoms protected by the separation of powers: the legislature criminalizes conduct and sets statutory penalties, the executive prosecutes crimes, and the judiciary interprets the law’s reach. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971). Lenity “strikes the appropriate balance between the legislature, the prosecutor, and the court

18
in defining criminal liability.” Liparota, 471 U.S. at

427.

Finally, and “perhaps most importantly,” lenity “embodies ‘the instinctive distaste against men languishing in prison unless the lawmaker has clearly said they should.’” Nasir, 17 F.4th at 472 (Bibas, J., concurring) (quoting Bass, 404 U.S. at 347). By promoting liberty, lenity “fits with one of the core purposes of our Constitution, to ‘secure the Blessings of Liberty’ for all[.]” Id. (quoting U.S. Const. pmbl.).

The rule of lenity is simply the mechanism this Court must employ to avoid the constitutional errors intrinsic to the Eleventh Circuit’s decision. Congress did not criminalize accidental departures from the standards of professional practice by prescribing physicians. It did not intend for doctors to languish in federal prison for decades based on good faith mistakes. But if there was some question about Congressional choice, then this Court must come down on the only side that respects due process and the separate roles that it, Congress, and the prosecution play. This Court should therefore require proof of a physician’s knowledge that he has departed from professional practice, knowledge that can be negated by his subjective good faith efforts to comply with prevailing standards.3

3 The Eleventh Circuit did not address the possibility that the government’s reading of the relevant regulation warranted interpretive deference. But that was because interpretive “deference does not apply in criminal cases,” because it is “defeat[ed]” by the “rule of lenity.” United States v. Phifer, 909 F.3d 372, 384–85 (11th Cir. 2018); see also Guedes v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives, 140 S. Ct. 789, 790page25image3203251904

Arlington, VA 22201
Telephone: 202.888.6881
CKruckenberg@pacificlegal.org ODunford@pacificlegal.org JKerkhoff@pacificlegal.org

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CONCLUSION

Dr. Ruan’s prosecution irrespective of his subjective good faith efforts to comply with the law is constitutionally untenable. Congress did not impose criminal liability in such instances. But a regulatory agency, particularly a prosecutorial one, cannot decide, on its own, that such conduct should be unlawful. Fair notice, the separation of powers, and our constitution’s essential desire to maximize liberty must not be so casually cast aside.

DATED: December 2021.
Respectfully submitted,

CALEB KRUCKENBERG JOHN F. KERKHOFF Pacific Legal Foundation 3100 Clarendon Blvd Suite 610

Counsel for Amicus Curiae Pacific Legal Foundation

(2020) (Gorsuch, J., statement regarding denial of certiorari) (“[W]hen liberty is at stake,” deference “has no role to play.”); Abramski v. United States, 573 U.S. 169, 191 (2014) (“The critical point is that criminal laws are for courts, not for the Government, to construe.”); United States v. Apel, 571 U.S. 359, 369 (2014) (“[W]e have never held that the Government’s reading of a criminal statute is entitled to any deference.”).

OLIVER J. DUNFORD

Counsel of Record

Pacific Legal Foundation 4440 PGA Blvd., Suite 307 Palm Beach Gardens, FL 33410

Telephone: (916) 503.9060page26image3323038416

 

“They’re literally making us sick”: Pharmacy workers describe conditions that sparked US walkouts

“They’re literally making us sick”: Pharmacy workers describe conditions that sparked US

walkouts

https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2021/12/23/cvsp-d23.html

Retail pharmacy workers conducted a nationwide walkout on Monday in the US, organized on social media, to protest worsening work conditions at large retail chains such as CVS, Walgreens and Walmart. As the hyper-infectious Omicron variant continues to spread throughout the country, this much overlooked section of the health care industry is making its own demands for better working conditions, including patient safety, and an overdue increase in wages.

One pharmacist who requested to remain anonymous told the WSWS, “We work 12 hour shifts without technicians, we have no breaks and no lunch break as the drive-thru has to be open. We have not had a raise in four years.” He emphasized the need for pharmacy technicians who “help take care of customers and type and count prescriptions, so if there is no tech, then the pharmacist has to try and do everything all while filling prescriptions accurately and giving COVID vaccinations.”

He said the job “gave me so much stress that I developed heart arrhythmia and had to be on meds. They’re literally making us sick.”

Even before the pandemic began, these workers already faced chronic under staffing and low pay, circumstances that were only made worse during the pandemic.

Bled Tanoe, the pharmacist who started the popular #pizzaisnotworking hashtag and Facebook group, spoke to the World Socialist Web Site on the conditions facing pharmacists. “There is no shortage of pharmacists,” she said, “but people are refusing to work in dangerous working conditions with high medical errors. There is a refusal to work in an environment that is detrimental to pharmacists and patients.”

Tanoe used to be a retail pharmacist at Walgreens, but she left her job after numerous years of stress and abuse in the opening months of the pandemic. She described the mental, physical and emotional stress on pharmacists who are leaving the profession in droves. “It is a very dangerous situation that people don’t realize. It’s not just putting medicine in bottles; someone has to check you don’t have an allergy, correct medication, the duration and everything are correct.” She described that there have been many instances where patients “get flu vaccine instead of COVID vaccine, or even the wrong vaccine entirely.”

Tanoe described the multiple responsibilities piled on pharmacists as similar to a pilot on a plane being “asked to serve drinks and take care of passengers while no one is running the plane.” Pharmacists have to “make sure medications are correct, in the right doses, make sure there are no issues with allergies, etc.”

The number of pharmacists nationwide who took part in the walkouts is not yet clear, but Tanoe noted that where pharmacy staff have not walked out, it was due to fear of retaliation by their employers, “not because they don’t want to.”

Such accounts are not uncommon. One worker on Twitter responded to a tweet by CVS Health’s CEO, Karen Lynch, about the massive profits the company made in its third quarter, “Karen I’ve been a worker at CVS for 6 straight years. You all can report HUGE earnings but WON’T pass those earnings on to us techs who work SOLO 40+ hours a week and develop medical problems because of being overworked without ‘enough hours’ to hire more people. Help US instead.”

In September, a pharmacist died of a heart attack on the floor of a CVS pharmacy after being told by a supervisor that she could not leave until another pharmacist arrived to relieve her two hours later. The hashtag #SheWaited has been used to bring attention to this senseless tragedy.

Such crippling conditions can contribute to pharmacists and pharmacy techs making dangerous errors while filling prescriptions. This led one pharmacist to write to the Texas Board of Pharmacy in April 2020: “I am a danger to the public working for CVS.” In December 2018, an 85-year-old Florida woman died after two weeks when she was accidentally given a strong chemotherapy drug instead of her usual medication.

Dr. Shane Jerominski, the southern California pharmacist who first issued the call for Monday’s walkouts, spoke with the World Socialist Web Site. “I tried to organize this as a show of solidarity, because we are working in unsafe environments and something has to give.

“It’s hard to say how many walked out.” explained Jerominski, “In the Palm Springs market, there were five stores closed. They have about 23 locations. They’re all understaffed.

“A lot of technicians could get behind it. They felt that if they didn’t show up that day, they can still operate. If the pharmacist doesn’t show up, the pharmacy can’t operate. Many pharmacists felt they couldn’t do that to their patients.”

Highlighting the brutal conditions facing pharmacy technicians, Jerominski noted, “In the Palm Springs market, it’s a cyclical market. Some technicians would be guaranteed 40 hours a week and then get flexed out in the summer.”

Jerominski explained his personal motivation for fighting to organize pharmacy workers. In March of 2021, Jerominski and his wife, Marylin, began warning about the stresses that the coronavirus vaccination campaign would place on already overburdened pharmacists without additional support. “My wife and I were featured at NBC with Lester Holt. She’s working at one of the busiest Walgreens in the area and now we’re expected to vaccinate everybody. They started with one every 15 minutes, then three every 15 minutes, and they still had to fill all the regular prescriptions.

“We thought they were going to fire her for talking to the media. Corporate basically promised her the world, said she would get extra help, but never delivered. They are making it very difficult for her to try to get her to quit. They don’t want to fire her. The media asked us to let them know if they fired her.”

Jerominski’s outspoken fight for the rights of pharmacy workers may have already resulted in retaliation against his independent pharmacy in Brawley, California. “I wanted to participate, I wanted my entire store closed. I had every intention of not being open as well on Monday at my location. On Friday—we’re open Monday through Friday—I opened the pharmacy and the second patient was an inspector from the board of pharmacy who had received an anonymous complaint to inspect the pharmacy. Now I have to submit a lot of paperwork by December 24 to keep my license and I had to work through the strike.

“I’ve been a pharmacist for 15 years and I’ve never seen a Board of Pharmacy inspection until I started working for an independent. The first time was about four and a half years ago, about three months after I started working here. That inspection first was due to issues with the prior pharmacist.”

Although it is unknown who filed this anonymous complaint, the timing is highly suspect. “Sitting on the California Board of Pharmacy are many middle-level managers of pharmacy chains,” noted Jerominski, “I think I made someone irritated.”

Jerominski remains determined to organize pharmacy workers for better conditions. “Pharmacists do have more power than they know. You can’t have the pharmacy open without them.”

COVID-19 Omicron Comes With A Symptom That Only Appears At Night

COVID-19 Omicron Comes With A Symptom That Only Appears At Night

https://www.btimesonline.com/articles/152865/20211222/covid-19-omicron-comes-symptom-appears-night.htm

Cough, fatigue, congestion, and runny nose were the top four symptoms when the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) released the Omicron variant’s first briefing on the symptoms of the early cases.

A doctor in the U.K. has now discovered a new COVID-19 symptom associated with the Omicron variant: severe night sweats.

The night sweats, says Dr. Amir Khan of the National Health Service in the United Kingdom, are “the kind of drenching night sweats where you might have to get up and change your clothes.”

According to the New York Post, Khan believes it is critical for health providers to highlight these symptoms so that patients are aware that they will need a test if they experience them.

As cases of COVID continue to rise, the Omicron variant has surpassed Delta as the most prevalent variant in the United States. Because Omicron is so new, there isn’t a lot of solid information regarding the new virus variant.

Because Delta mutated from the original virus, it reduced some vaccine protection against COVID-19 infection (and natural immunity).

Researchers have since discovered data from a major outbreak in Norway, which provides some insight into how the omicron form acts in fully vaccinated populations.

Researchers spoke with 111 of the 117 participants who attended a party on Nov. 26 in Norway. 89% of the 111 people who were interviewed received two doses of an mRNA vaccine. No one claimed to have received a booster shot.Sixty-six of the 111 people questioned had confirmed cases of COVID-19, whereas 15 had potential cases.

Only one case was asymptomatic, and 91% of persons with COVID-19 had at least three symptoms over the duration of their illness.

It’s not the first time we’ve heard of night sweats. According to Al Jazeera, Dr. Angelique Coetzee, the South African doctor who raised the alarm about the omicron coronavirus variant, some COVID-19 symptoms from the new variant are often “very, very mild” compared to COVID-19 symptoms from the Delta form.

It is crucial to highlight that Omicron’s symptoms are not dissimilar to those experienced by fully vaccinated people when infected with the original coronavirus strains. Headache, runny nose, sneezing, sore throat, and loss of smell were among the symptoms.

Dr. Anthony Fauci told NBC that while data from South Africa suggests that those infected with COVID-19 from the Omicron variety have a “less requirement for oxygen,” that doesn’t mean the virus is any less dangerous

Pfizer’s Paxlovid: is this going to be the final savior in treating COVID-19 ?

Josh Bloom is a very smart individual, but I remain skeptical of this anti-viral… we have had Tamiflu on the market for years and the “window of opportunity” to start taking this medication is rather small – 2-3 days from onset of symptoms. In my 50+ yrs as a Pharmacist, it wasn’t until last year, I don’t ever remember the FDA approving a med with EUA (Emergency Use Authorization) – especially for general use.  These COVID-19 vaccinations are basically the largest clinical trial – with no control group – and apparently pretty poor tracking of adverse events and/or interactions with the pt’s other medications or comorbidity issues.  It has been reported that a lot of people catching Omicron are asymptomatic and thus they are running around with what may appear to be a “runny nose” and actually spreading Omicron…. might explain why the people infected with Omicron is doubling every 2-3 days.  On top of all this, it has been stated that the quadrivalent flu vaccine has largely missed the appropriate prevailing flu that is going around.  Of course, last year… I read statements from a lot of pharmacists they they were not getting few – if any – Rxs for Tamiflu… so was last year flu Dx as COVID-19 ?  Only time will tell and once all the “dust” settles

 

Round 4: Pfizer’s Paxlovid Is Approved. Will It Knock Out Covid?

https://www.acsh.org/news/2021/12/22/round-4-pfizers-paxlovid-approved-will-it-knock-out-covid-16014

It was pretty much a forgone conclusion, but the FDA’s granting of an Emergency Use Approval to Pfizer’s COVID drug Paxlovid could mark the turning point in our battle against the virus. Here’s the story that you won’t find anywhere in the press.

It’s not totally absurd to compare our war against COVID with a boxing match. The virus clearly won Round 1; aside from masks and isolation, we were pretty much defenseless. Round 2 unanimously went to science; the vaccines worked very well, and perhaps we were on the cusp of ending the pandemic. But it wasn’t a knockout; the virus was saved by the bell. Round 3 is harder to score. Although there is clear evidence that hospitalizations and deaths are mostly confined to the unvaccinated, no one expected the one-two punch of delta and omicron, once again sending the world into a panic, with lockdowns, mask mandates, and quarantines returning to a world that wanted no part of them. 

Round 4 started today, with the FDA granting Emergency Use Authorization (EUA) to Pfizer’s Paxlovid (1,2), something that was a foregone conclusion. Paxlovid is an effective, direct-acting antiviral drug that can be taken orally in pill form. If life makes any sense at all, Round 4 will be won by science. But instead of a knockout, I would expect multiple knockdowns. But, when added to the beat down that the virus took in Round 2 from the vaccines, we can reasonably expect that the match will end with both opponents standing and the judges awarding the match to science by points. Translation: COVID isn’t going away, but its threat to human health will be significantly reduced. 

All of this is possible because, unlike what happened with Merck’s molnupiravir, the interim clinical results for Paxlovid held up in the final analysis, while molnupiravir’s efficacy dropped significantly when all the data were analyzed. Pfizer’s gain will likely be Merck’s loss, which is a shame because the two drugs operate by a different mechanism and could be used to complement each other, just like cocktails of drugs of different classes turned HIV/AIDS into a manageable, chronic disease instead of a guaranteed death sentence. 

As I have written here and here, Paxlovid is a potent inhibitor of the viral Mpro (main protease) enzyme, which is responsible for chemically cutting newly-formed viral protein, which is initially a single long, non-functional protein, into multiple functional proteins that enable viral replication. Inhibitors of viral protease enzymes became approved drugs for both HIV/AIDS and hepatitis C.  

Clinical data were consistent with the antiviral profile of Paxlovid. In other words, both the inhibition of Mpro in an enzymatic assay and inhibition of viral replication in a cell-based assay were predictive (3) of the drug’s efficacy in humans. The drug, when taken early in the infection, (4) reduced hospitalizations by 89% and deaths by 100% and had no adverse effects (5). As someone who did antiviral research in a former life, these data are nothing short of spectacular. 

Dr. Paul Offit, director of the Vaccine Education Center at the Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia, an FDA advisor, and a former ACSH Trustee had this to say:

Would you be more likely to take this drug than you would to get a vaccine? I think the answer to that question is yes…So therefore it is of value for those 40 million, 50 million people in this country who simply refuse to be vaccinated. I mean, this may keep them out of the hospital.

Dr. Paul Offit in an interview with CNBC

Offit also stressed that immunizing unvaccinated people remains the ultimate goal. Indeed, it is always preferable to prevent an infection than treat it. 

What about the variants?

As expected, all the variants tested were susceptible to inhibition by Paxlovid; the drug operates by a mechanism that has nothing to do with the viral spike proteins. It shuts down the virus’ internal replication, which operates independently of the spikes; these act to bind to host cells and permit their entry into the cells. Although it is conceivable, perhaps even likely, that eventually, the virus will mutate in a way to make Paxlovid less effective, this process will take much longer than the rapid-fire emergence of increasingly contagious variants.

Supply could be an issue

Unlike molnupiravir (6), which is relatively easy to synthesize, PF-07321332 (now called nirmatrelvir), the active component of the pill is not; the molecule is far more complex and more effort and time are required to complete the synthesis. But, in anticipation of the EUA (and ultimately full approval) Pfizer invested $1 billion to increase it manufacturing capacity. 

Bottom Line

The addition of an effective antiviral drug to the arsenal of weapons against COVID should be a major advance in letting the steam out of a virus that has had a huge, two-year impact on the entire world. In the absence of an unpleasant surprise, we are witnessing the quintessential example of how pharmaceutical science (7) can defeat disease, as well as one of the most important medical advances of our time.

NOTES

(1) Paxlovid is a two-drug combination of PF-07321332 aka nirmatrelvir, the active drug, and ritonavir, which inhibits its metabolism.

(2) At this time, the approval is limited to emergency use in both high-risk adults and high-risk pediatric patients 12 years of age and older weighing at least 40 kg. 

(3) All the enzyme and cell-based data in the world cannot predict efficacy in people. A successful oral drug must be well-absorbed, sufficiently stable to metabolism, and be effective with an acceptable degree of toxicity.

(4) Rapid, widely available testing is essential for using Paxlovid. Right now the US is woefully lacking in this area.

(5) During the clinical trial, the drug-treated group reported slightly fewer side effects than the placebo group, probably indicating that the drug made them feel better.

(6) Molnupiravir just took the first of (presumably) many hits. France had ordered a bunch of the drug. They just canceled the order.

(7) No drug gets discovered and developed this fast. Ever. The pioneering work was done in 2003 when the Pfizer group was exploring possible coronavirus therapies. Paxlovid is closely related, although superior, to the first-generation experimental drugs.