Oregon: HERC members talking about chronic pain patients after they left the meeting

Published on Apr 3, 2019

Shorter version. HERC Meeting March 14th 2019. HERC members talking about chronic pain patients after they left the meeting. What was expected to be the final vote on the chronic pain task force proposal for medicaid, was paused they say, to investigate a possible conflict of interest by members and staff of HERC. This portion of the HERC meeting was a roundtable style discussion with the Chief Medical Officer of the OHA, and voting members of HERC, some of whom are also members of the chronic pain task force. * Introduction to the HERC meeting begins at the 38 min mark and goes to the 50 min mark. The audio begins with the HERC and OHA Chief discussions and how the HERC profiles and sees patients who testify and who they serve in a public health position. OHA Public News Release on pause: https://www.oregon.gov/oha/ERD/Pages/… World renouned pain experts have spoken out – against.. Oregon’s radical medicaid population experiment. Sean Mackey, MD, PHD Chief, Division of Pain Medicine Expert letter and Expert signatures https://static1.squarespace.com/stati…

 

 

 

 

Express Scripts won’t cover Eli Lilly’s new generic insulin

Insulin pens on an assembly line.Express Scripts won’t cover Eli Lilly’s new generic insulin

https://www.axios.com/express-scripts-wont-cover-eli-lilly-insulin-lispro-37c347da-9383-425c-b3f2-8af755f7a1ae.html

Eli Lilly’s new “authorized generic” of its pricey Humalog insulin, called Lispro, is excluded from the 2019 national list of covered drugs from pharmacy benefit manager Express Scripts.

The big picture: So much for all the fanfare when Eli Lilly unveiled the insulin last month. Lispro’s price doesn’t change net spending on the insulin, even though it is cheaper for people paying cash out of pocket, and PBMs have little incentive to cover the drug if a rebate doesn’t exist or is tiny.

 

Does this just give everyone just one more proof that the PBM’s  – which Express Scripts is one of the top three, along with CVS’s Caremark and United Health’s Optium Rx – are more part of the problem of high Rx prices than part of the solution.   Apparently Lilly is paying little to nothing in the format of rebates, discounts or KICKBACKS.  The PBM industry was created as an answer to the UAW’s (Ford, GM, Chrysler, International Harvester, John Deere)  new contract in the fall of 1969.  They were suppose to save everyone money…  back then they were < 5% of the Rx business …but..today they are involved in the pricing and paying for 90%+ of all prescriptions and larger percent of the Rx market they got.. the more that they got into “forcing” the pharmas’ to give them discounts, rebates, KICKBACKS if the pharma wanted one or more of their medications on their formulary … meaning that they would be covered without prior authorization or quantity limits.  I have read where some pharmas are have to pay some 40% -50% of the wholesale price to the PBM to get their meds on a particular formulary.

 

 

What Is Your State Doing About Pain?

What Is Your State Doing About Pain?

www.nationalpainreport.com/what-is-your-state-doing-about-pain-8839662.html

The Federation of State Medical Boards is meeting in Fort Worth, Texas this weekend—and the “opioid” crisis is on the agenda.

“The State Medical Boards must lead the effort on regulation of the opioid crisis. The DEA and other federal agencies must work with the Medical Boards to avoid confusion with physicians legitimately taking care of their patients.”

Sherif Zaafran, MD, tweeted out his comments made as the Federation meeting got underway.

Dr. Zaafran is the head of the Texas Medical Board and a member of the HHS Pain Management Best Practices Inter-Agency Task Force and a very important voice

Saturday, he will also moderate a discussion of nationally recognized leaders who will “discuss new steps in the effort to address the nation’s opioid crisis. Included on that panel is Vanila M. Singh, MD, MACM, who is the chair of the Pain Management Task Force that calls for patient-centered approach to improve treatment of pain.

That Task Force Draft Report received some 6,000 public comments and the HHS group will gather again in May to adopt it.

“The action is at the state level,” said Terri Lewis, Ph.D. “Pain patients and physicians need to ask their state medical boards, what are you doing now?”

Just this month, two federal agencies eased some previous guidance on opioid prescribing.

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention said many physicians have misapplied the 2016 guideline that resulted in a serious reduction on opioid prescribing.  The CDC tacitly acknowledged many physicians’ responses to the opioid crisis went too far.

Earlier this month, the FDA issued a safety announcement that it said “identifies harm reported from sudden discontinuation of opioid pain medicines and requires label changes to guide prescribers on gradual, individualized tapering.”

These agencies have been receiving blowback—and plenty of it—from medical professionals who believe that the reaction to the “opioid crisis” tilted dangerously toward those who become addicted from opioids versus the million of chronic pain patients who were adversely affected by the physicians, insurers and state regulators reaction.

Here’s one of the National Pain Report stories on it.

The question now is what will the state medical boards do with this new information?

The answers may begin to come this weekend in Texas.

The DEA “playing games” most likely is NOT OVER

FDA issues the rules all other agencies must follow. No agency outranks FDA

AMA welcomes CDC’s revised view on opioids guidelines

After posting these last night and pulling the title of the posts from the article itself…  I started reviewing the “whole game” that is being played out between the DOJ/DEA, FDA, CDC  and countless other agencies and healthcare corporations and provider that are struggling with the CDC guideline.

I have stated many times before, that the one agency that is completely silent and/or missing from the conversations is the DEA .

In all of this, what has not been revised is the Controlled Substance Act (1970)  (CSA) and it appears that the DEA’s authority in using the CSA apparently remains UNCHANGED.

This is how the DEA could keep screwing with the chronic pain community:

 

 

  • The DEA controls the licenses of those who produce, prescribe or dispense controlled meds.
  •  The Pharmas:  the DEA still can raise/lower the annual production quotas that each pharma is allowed to produce each year. Opiate Rxs peaked in 2012 and end the ensuing years, the DEA has already decreased production quotas have been DECREASED abt 50% of what was allowed in 2012.
  • Wholesalers: the BIG THREE (Amerisource, McKesson, Cardinal controls about 80%+ of the medication market in the USA. Walgreens owns part of Amerisouce – not sure if it is a minority or majority interest. Cardinal is the primary wholesaler for CVS and Mc Kesson is the primary wholesaler for Rite Aid. The wholesaler Rochester Drug Cooperative, Inc – that was recently fined by the DEA for failing to report suspicious large pharmacy orders… it was reported that they are a “major wholesaler”, but they are really part of the “secondary wholesaler market” and are really “small potatoes” in the overall wholesaler market place.  In Jan 2017, Mc Kesson paid 150 million fine ( https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/mckesson-agrees-pay-record-150-million-settlement-failure-report-suspicious-orders ) for the same violation that Rochester Drug Cooperative, Inc was accused of and at least one of Rochester’s exec is facing 10 yrs in jail.  DEA licenses wholesalers and can fabricate charges against wholesalers, fine the crap out of them and suspend the DEA licensed to one or more distribution centers.
  • Prescribers:  We have seen the DEA fabricate charges and raid prescribers offices, close their practice down, use civil asset seizure laws to confiscate all their assets and put them in the DEA’S coffer.  We have also seen the DEA use nothing but the number of Rxs and/or doses to justify a raid on a practice.
  • Pharmacies: Pharmacies are licensed by the DEA, Pharmacists do not have a DEA license.  CVS was recently fined 535 million because the DEA claimed that several stores filled a total of 39 bogus C-II Rxs  https://patch.com/rhode-island/woonsocket/cvs-fined-535-000-filling-fake-opioid-prescriptions
  • Pharmacy & Medical licensing boards:  These boards usually “play along” with the DEA in fining or “busting” providers.  The Medical board is mostly staffed with DEA licensed prescribers and Pharmacy boards are mostly staffed with non-practicing corporate Pharmacists – whose chains that they work for does have DEA licenses in their pharmacies.
  • Then there is that part of the controlled substance act “Corresponding Responsibility”  ( https://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/21cfr/cfr/1306/1306_04.htm ) A prescription for a controlled substance to be effective must be issued for a legitimate medical purpose by an individual practitioner acting in the usual course of his professional practice. The responsibility for the proper prescribing and dispensing of controlled substances is upon the prescribing practitioner, but a corresponding responsibility rests with the pharmacist who fills the prescription. An order purporting to be a prescription issued not in the usual course of professional treatment or in legitimate and authorized research is not a prescription within the meaning and intent of section 309 of the Act (21 U.S.C. 829) and the person knowingly filling such a purported prescription, as well as the person issuing it, shall be subject to the penalties provided for violations of the provisions of law relating to controlled substances.  Because the DEA’s statutory authority only concerns the diversion of controlled substances for illegitimate uses.. they have no authority – and thus doesn’t have to care – if valid prescription does not get filled and the valid medical need of a pt is met.

So with this revision of the CDC guidelines and the FDA getting on board, the authority and the actions of the DEA against all DEA license holders and chronic pain pts could remain unchanged.

We know that the DEA abt 4 yrs ago “forced” all of the drug wholesalers to RATION controlled substances to pharmacies which is a violation of the Interstate commerce law ( https://www.britannica.com/topic/interstate-commerce-United-States-law ) but when the entity (DOJ) that is suppose to be enforcing this law is the same entity that is causing the law to be violated… who do you turn to ?

You can ask the same question about the Americans with Disability Act and the discrimination against chronic pain pts when they are denied acceptance into a practice, a Rx filled at a pharmacy or some other issue ?

Hypothetical:  FDA/CDC and other oversight agencies implement policies and procedures that legit chronic pain pts are entitled to getting adequate pain therapy, but the DEA has continued to lower the pharma’s annual quota… wholesalers don’t have to forcibly ration controls to pharmacies …there will not be enough production to cover all the needs of acute and chronic pain pts.

Previously, I have been told that some pharmacies made sure that their “regular pts” got their pain meds and others fill controlled meds on a first come … first serve basis… when they ran out of a particular med towards the end of the month… everyone of their regular pts are just OUT OF LUCK ?

We all hear routinely, that the illicit use/abuse of controlled substances has DESTROYED families, but no one talks about how the CDC opiate dosing guidelines and their implementation has destroyed families as chronic pain pts have had their pain management therapy reduced or totally taken away.  

Let’s hope that the changes that are coming out from the CDC and FDA do not end up doing more damage than the original launch of the CDC opiates dosing guidelines has caused over the past three years because of the DEA, DOJ and our politicians being entrenched in believing that opiate prescribing to treat chronic pain is the gateway to people using/abuse illicit drugs and ODing.

They are using laws and breaking laws to deny pain pts their necessary medications… and IMO… the chronic pain community is never going to get justice and their needed medications unless they get their dollars together into a legal defense fund to level the playing field by engaging law firms or lobbyists to help us do that.

FDA issues the rules all other agencies must follow. No agency outranks FDA

CDC Officially Begins Issuing Corrections to Opioid “Guidelines”

Guideline Corrections Issued Three Years after Catastrophic Damage Wrought on Chronic Disease Community

www.medium.com/@heatherzamm/cdc-officially-begins-issuing-corrections-to-opioid-guidelines-3d79b68993f5

The Centers for Disease Control (CDC) released an official statement to the mainstream media on Wednesday, April 24, 2019, with “clarification” regarding their 2016 Guidelines for Opioid Prescribing for Treatment of Chronic Non Cancer Pain.

To wit, they caution against forced tapers, discontinuing opioid therapy in patients who have been on opioid therapy long term, and against lowering doses to low levels that cause patient harms.

In perusing the linked page to the 2016 guidelines, which this author has visited several times a week for well over a year, it must be noted that the page has undergone an overhaul in the new year. It is much more “friendly” than previously, with kinder language, explanations contained on the landing page and site links that were not there before. One can use the Internet archive to look back and see the changes from previous.

CDC has announced they are in line with FDA regarding forced tapering of opioid medication in long time opioid therapy patients. This should not come as a surprise to anyone. What is a surprise is that any announcement is being made at all in this fashion by the CDC.

FDA is the authority in the Unites States regarding all prescribed medication and rules governing medication.

FDA issues the rules all other agencies must follow. No agency outranks FDA.

Astonishingly, the CDC guidelines have been adhered to across the board without a single document or rubber stamp from FDA.

This is a grave matter to consider. One that all Americans should really think about.

The regulatory agency that issues all rules regarding medications never once issued any official permissions from their agency for the wholesale application of the CDC guidelines for Prescribing Opioids for Chronic Pain.

Yet, the United States has across the board clinically applied these harmful guidelines. What does this say about authority?

To include over 30 states basing erroneous and extremely harmful legislation upon these guidelines. What does this mean? We need to really think about this.

It appears that some of the stakeholders ignored the hierarchy of government agency structure in their zeal to throttle opioids — even in the face of all that data we showed them time and again proving that what we were saying was true, that painful disease patients were not causing their “opioid crisis”.

They completely ignored the authority of the FDA.

It appears that those in the know counted on “Everyday Joe American” not understanding the rules around prescribed medication policy.

What is worse, the American public has passively allowed some to practice medicine via legislation in over half of our 50 states… all based on these guidelines issued by the CDC, which were never officially endorsed by the regulatory body FDA.

When advocates pointed out medicine was being practiced without a license, that FDA had never officially adopted the CDC guidelines as policy; they were demonized, ridiculed, and discredited.

What do we have left today?

A situation where an agency that has no business issuing policy statements on any drugs walking back a massively misapplied guideline that was blanket enforced across the United States without approval by the very government agency created to keep citizens from harm due to thoughtless policy such as this.

We must be serious and thoughtful about this going forward.

Why was this patently ignored by all involved?

Why were stakeholders encouraged to practice medicine without a license based on these guidelines, not based on thoughtful guidance from the actual rule making and regulatory agency on drugs — FDA?

It makes little sense, unless you view it through the lens of the population based study discovered by CIAAG and confirmed in DC on April 8, 2019.


F. Arcaeus, pages from ‘A most excellent and compendius….’. Credit: Wellcome Collection

The current narrative CDC is promulgating places the blame for the guideline fiasco, patient deaths, misery and force tapering on “physician misapplication”.

This is nothing more than artful deflection and political pandering at the highest levels.

Firstly, why would the CDC place a disclaimer on their work in the first place? Surely, if they were confident in their contracted work and guidance, there would be no need for a CYA.

Also, one needs to look no further than the DEA and their unhinged arresting of physicians, left and right, through PDMP (prescription drug program monitoring) targeting.

If physicians have “been allowed” all along (per what the CDC is now saying) to prescribe opioids at the amounts patients require to relieve their pain, then why is the DEA using the PDMP to target physicians who… prescribe any opioids?

In fact, isn’t the PDMP supposed to be an aid for doctors to keep drug addicts from working the system, not a tool for law enforcement (99.9% of whom are clueless about pharmacology and medicine, dosages) to use to target doctors in some kind of fantastical “pre-crime” Minority Report profiling system?

Social engineering has conditioned society at this point to view any person who needs or uses opioids in a negative, dim way. Therefore the CDC knows that they can wholesale push anything onto the public at this point and it will be believed by most, unquestioned.

Please start asking questions.

Don’t let these agencies attempt to talk their way, shame patients and doctors, and weasel around their extremely questionable actions and culpability.

It makes virtually no sense at all, the way this has all unfolded. Now it appears that it will be rugswept and hopefully no one with a credible reach will point it out to the public.

To illustrate how nonsensical the entire scenario has been and still is, think of it in this way:

Insurers are tired of paying out claims on texting and driving accidents. They want to reduce the numbers of teenagers even getting licenses in the first place. Stakeholders reach out to FCC.

In response, the FCC issues a broad guidance on driver’s licenses, across the country. All drivers license centers that test people for drivers licenses have a list of suggestions, 18 to be precise, of things that FCC thinks are pertinent to the fight against texting and driving.

These suggestions are not laws. They are not issued by Congress. However, the drivers license centers notice that if they don’t implement the suggestions, their funding is denied at the state level. Many of the centers have had to close in the wake of the suggestions. Some of the drivers license test implementers think the suggestions are unfair. These people have gotten visits from the government. They have been threatened with early retirement from government service or loss of their pension if they don’t go along with the suggestions from FCC. Whistleblowing does nothing. Whistleblowing only works if one can whistle blow to an agency that isn’t in on the scam… if they are all in, it does nothing but put a target on one’s back.

Others have pointed out that FCC has zero jurisdiction over drivers licenses. That is under the jurisdiction of the DMV.

Anyone who points this out finds themselves the target of attacks, personal and professional. The person finds their reputation is quickly destroyed in an insidious, relentless manner.

Soon the vast majority of the United States public believes that driver’s licenses are a very expensive and time consuming ordeal to obtain, versus what they used to be, a rite of passage for a teenager- something a parent would look forward to doing with their child as the age approached. People on social media view and attack others who speak out on this issue as non-conformist, elitist, or conspirators, as well as horrible parents for allowing their children to even drive, thanks to being socially engineered by government hired influencers.

The fact that a federal agency that had no invitation or business injecting themselves into rules and regulations of another agency is not even noted by anyone. It was worked out behind closed doors as usual.

The goal was obtained. Reducing the number of driver’s licenses being sought in the first place.


A simple analogy to illustrate.

It is this big, and the loss of critical thinking skills is how we have gotten to this point as a society.

No one thinks thoughtfully anymore before they make a judgment on an issue in today’s culture, largely because everything is designed to be “up to the minute, blink and you’ll miss it, move out of the way, so fast”.

Consider the idea pushed so heavily regarding opioid addiction — that “addiction will happen in three days exposure”.

Addiction will happen in three days exposure, to a person predisposed to addiction to any substance, guaranteed, for sure. Whether it be alcohol, nicotine, methamphetamines, cocaine, opioids… if one is an addict, it will happen.

However, most of the adult population of the United States has been exposed to an opioid medication at some point of their life by age 30. We do not have a society of 350 million opioid addicts.

This is a classic example of the social engineering promulgated upon society laid bare for all to see. Our parents and grandparents were not opioid addicts. They would not have entertained the notion that this was true. Why do we?

We hear stories of the infamous “morphine addicts” of long ago before morphine was made a prescription item — the women (of course) who were “addicted” to the cough syrups loaded with morphine and sold by country peddlers.

I have read these stories myself. I always think:

  • “How many of these women had untreated painful disease? Is it hard to imagine many did?”
  • “How presumptuous is it to assume all these women were ‘addicts’ and not merely dependent upon these medicines, went through withdrawal and were fine? I have never once read the word dependent in a single account.”
  • “Did these women destroy their lives, their families, after these medicines were put behind the counter? Or did they carry on with life? No one has much to say after the dramatic proclamation that there were ‘hoards of female morphine addicts.”
  • “Who is to say they were all ‘morphine addicts’? (Only those with an agenda to push).”
  • “Misogyny is alive and well, even in historical storytelling. Women were “hysterical patients and exaggerating their symptoms” throughout history. Why would today’s women expect any different treatment?”

Please unite, stand up against these false narratives, these untruths, these engineered stories, and demand action for patients and society in the name of informed consent and truth in health care decision making.

Allowing our physicians to practice medicine without state sponsored restrictions, free and unfettered, should be first and foremost.

They are licensed and trained. They should be allowed to fully practice medicine under the law, as they are trained to do.

The legislation proposed and put into place in over half the states that is based upon guidelines that weren’t even approved by the regulatory body overseeing medications in the United States could be challenged at the very least. Legislation that was written by people not trained or licensed to practice medicine, I might add.

The forced compliance of society to participate in a study that was engineered into place without their informed consent is also a grave concern.

The PDMP system stand alone is wrought with privacy issues. It is extremely vulnerable to attack, easy to exploit, has very sensitive patient information contained within and no one in a position of authority seems to care that all of it is on the cloud without a single signature of informed consent.

The vast majority of patients do not even realize this system exists or what it even is or contains! I fail to see how any insurer or healthcare system could possibly think this falls under informed decision making or consensual care, or possibly justify this system as any kind of team building with the patient included.

These are but a couple of very real concerns that are glaringly obvious. Consider these, read the linked documents, and consider what I have said some more.

 

Photo by JJ Jordan on Unsplash

I don’t want any person to make quick decisions. I want every person to be thoughtful and deliberate in how they decide to proceed. I hope that all who read my work decide to unite behind the message — that we are taking our patient power back, as free American citizens, and demanding truth and transparency in our healthcare going forward.


CIAAG has the full dossier of Violation of a Nation at their website. Please download all documents and spread the truth of the government population study/clinical trial.

The only truly free society is an informed society.

Is this how the CDC justified – to themselves – about their authority to create opiate dosing guidelines ?


Some of us has always wondered if the CDC really had any statutory authority to generate the opiate dosing guidelines since their primary statutory authority is to deal with contagious diseases.

Maybe they didn’t and that is why the then head of the CDC Thomas R. Frieden quickly made public statements that the guidelines did not bear the weight of law – they were just suggestions/guidelines.

A couple of nights ago, I going over a couple of pages from the CDC’s annual budget and there was a line item for dealing with HIV, HEP B & C.

One of the problems with substance abuse is the sharing of needles and likewise the sharing of any disease(s) that any of the previous people who had used the needle had.

A few years ago, the small southern Indiana Scott County had a “outbreak” of HIV, Hep B & C with about 200 people.  After all the dust settled, all of those pts .. 85% of the HIV, Hep B & C were DNA verified from the same source… strongly suggested a lot of “needle sharing” of the substance abusers in Scott County.

So who within or outside of the CDC got convinced the CDC that if they tried to address opiate use/abuse… a reduction in substance abuse would decrease and also would the prevalence of the CONTAGIOUS DISEASES of HIV, Hep  B & C.  Which they get money to address.

The war on drugs is a 81 billion/yr and primary function of all bureaucracies is to grow their budget and the number of people on the payroll, because in the political world those two things equate to POWER & INFLUENCE in that world.

There is nothing in our legislative system that guarantees that a bill that Congress passes and a President signs into law or a agency creates a new interpretation of an existing law/regulation.. that it is constitution. Until someone challenges the constitutionality of the law/interpretation in our court system… Those laws/interpretation can be applied/enforced until they are declared unconstitutional by our court system.  Of course, the only ones who win in challenging the constitutionality of a law/interpretation is the law firms.

USA TODAY Investigation: VA knowingly hires doctors with past malpractice claims, discipline for poor care

A USA TODAY investigation finds the Department of Veterans Affairs has repeatedly hired healthcare workers with problem pasts, like neurosurgeon John Henry Schneider, whose license had been revoked after a patient death. USA TODAY

https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2017/12/03/usa-today-investigation-va-knowingly-hires-doctors-past-malpractice-claims-discipline-poor-care/909170001/

Neurosurgeon John Henry Schneider racked up more than a dozen malpractice claims and settlements in two states, including cases alleging he made surgical mistakes that left patients maimed, paralyzed or dead.

He was accused of costing one patient bladder and bowel control after placing spinal screws incorrectly, he allegedly left another paralyzed from the waist down after placing a device improperly in his spinal canal. The state of Wyoming revoked his medical license after another surgical patient died.

Schneider then applied for a job earlier this year at the Department of Veterans Affairs hospital in Iowa City, Iowa. He was forthright in his application about the license revocation and other malpractice troubles.

But the VA hired him anyway.

He started work in April at a hospital that serves 184,000 veterans in 50 counties in Iowa, Illinois and Missouri.

Some of his patients already have suffered complications. Schneider performed four brain surgeries in a span of four weeks on one 65-year-old veteran who died in August, according to interviews with Schneider and family members. He has performed three spine surgeries on a 77-year-old Army veteran since July — the last two to try and clean up a lumbar infection from the first, the patient said.

Schneider’s hiring is not an isolated case. 

A VA hospital in Oklahoma knowingly hired a psychiatrist previously sanctioned for sexual misconduct who went on to sleep with a VA patient, according to internal documents. A Louisiana VA clinic hired a psychologist with felony convictions. The VA ended up firing him after they determined he was a “direct threat to others” and the VA’s mission.

As a result of USA TODAY’s investigation of Schneider, VA officials determined his hiring — and potentially that of an unknown number of other doctors — was illegal.

Federal law bars the agency from hiring physicians whose license has been revoked by a state board, even if they still hold an active license in another state. Schneider still has a license in Montana, even though his Wyoming license was revoked.

VA spokesman Curt Cashour said agency officials provided hospital officials in Iowa City with “incorrect guidance” green-lighting Schneider’s hire. The VA moved to fire Schneider last Wednesday. He resigned instead.

Cashour also said the VA would look into whether other doctors had been improperly hired.

“We will take the same prompt removal action with any other improper hires we discover,” he said.

A USA TODAY investigation in October revealed how the VA has for years concealed shoddy care and mistakes by medical workers when they leave the agency, allowing them to escape their pasts and potentially endanger patients elsewhere.

The results of the investigation of Schneider and other VA practitioners with problem pasts reveal potentially dangerous shortfalls when they join the agency as well.

More: VA conceals shoddy care and health workers’ mistakes

More: Exclusive: Botched surgery, delayed diagnosis at a one-star ‘house of horrors’ VA hospital

The VA Medical Center in Iowa City is pictured in 2014.(Photo: Press-Citizen file photo) (Photo: Press-Citizen)

In response to the findings, Cashour said the agency is also initiating an “independent, third-party clinical review” of the care Schneider provided with complications in Iowa City relayed to USA TODAY by patients or family members.

In an interview, Schneider maintained that he has not provided substandard care. He blamed poor outcomes for patients on other providers involved in their treatment or on unfortunate complications not caused by his care.    

Schneider said his insurance company decided to settle some of his prior cases regardless of their merit, and he filed an appeal of the Wyoming revocation, a case that’s still pending. 

“I’m a neurosurgeon; neurosurgeons across the country get litigation because of complications related to surgery,” he said.

Of 15 malpractice complaints identified by USA TODAY, four were settled, and two were dropped by plaintiffs. Six others were deemed valid by a trustee after Schneider filed bankruptcy in 2014, court records show. The trustee rejected the other claims.

More: VA still in critical condition, Secretary David Shulkin says

More: Lawmakers rip VA on failure to report potentially dangerous medical providers

One malpractice lawyer and neurosurgeon who is not familiar with Schneider’s case said that in general, having a dozen malpractice claims in as many years raises red flags.

“That’s certainly not usual. It’s definitely an outlier.” said Larry Schlachter, author of Malpractice: A Neurosurgeon Reveals How Our Health Care System Puts Patients at Risk. 

For Schneider’s former patients and their family members, news of his hiring at the VA and return to the operating room after his Wyoming license was revoked came as a shock.  

“What in the world?” said Scherry Lee, who is awaiting payment for a malpractice complaint against Schneider after a failed neck surgery in Wyoming in 2012. She says it left her in debilitating pain with difficulty speaking and swallowing. “How does this happen, especially with a neurosurgeon?”

A trail of malpractice claims

Less than two months after Montana issued Schneider a medical license in 1997, Jason Zimmerman was rushed to the emergency room at St. Vincent Healthcare in Billings.

He had excess fluid building up around his brain that was creating dangerous intracranial pressure, according to court records. A tube and valve system that had been implanted to drain excess cerebrospinal fluid had malfunctioned.

His family sued Schneider and a practice partner alleging they provided substandard care and Zimmerman suffered “profound neurological injury” that left him permanently impaired, the complaint says.

He and his family members ultimately dropped their malpractice suit because they worried Zimmerman’s prior substance abuse would impede the case, his sister Wendy Conaway told USA TODAY. Schneider blamed his partner for the injuries.

But it was only the first of four malpractice claims he would face over the next five years from surgical patients at St. Vincent hospital. The others settled for undisclosed amounts, court records show.

They included the case of Lloyd Hickey, who was paralyzed from the waist down after Schneider allegedly implanted a device improperly in his spinal canal, and Carmen Riddle, who lost bladder and bowel control after three spine surgeries by Schneider. The wife of Thomas Deiling settled her wrongful death claim against Schneider after her husband died from complications after four surgeries.

“I continued the lawsuit hoping I could force him out of practice, but I couldn’t because of the cap on medical negligence lawsuits,” Jeanine Deiling said in a recent interview. She said Schneider failed to properly diagnose and quickly treat a pervasive infection that ended up eating away at her husband’s spine.  

Her best hope, Deiling said, was to add hers to the list of malpractice claims, and “if enough lawsuits added up, he’d never be able to get malpractice insurance and he’d have to quit practicing.”

Schneider did stop performing surgeries in Montana, but he started performing them in Wyoming instead. And he formed a company, Northern Rockies Insurance Company, that provided his own malpractice insurance, a move that eventually helped land him in bankruptcy and unable to pay off all his claims.

At hospitals in Cody and Powell, Wyo., and a surgical center in Sheridan, Wyo., Schneider performed operations between 2006 and 2012 that eventually prompted at least eight more malpractice complaints.

Online biography for John Henry Schneider. (Photo: www.udemy.com/user/dr-schneider/)

The case that captured the attention of Wyoming Board of Medicine officials was Russell Monaco, a father of two who went under Schneider’s knife in 2011 for a procedure to decrease pressure on nerves in his lower back, according to a wrongful death suit filed by his wife, Kathy.

After the operation, he was prescribed a litany of narcotics that can depress breathing, including fentanyl, oxycodone, valium, and Demerol. Monaco’s oxygen levels dropped dangerously low, but Schneider discharged him anyway, medical board records show.

He went home and took the medications as prescribed, the lawsuit says, but his family found him dead the next morning. The coroner determined the cause of death was “mixed drug overdose.”

“I tried to wake him up and yelled and the girls came down screaming,” his wife, Kathy Monaco, told USA TODAY. “It was horrible, I mean, I live that day over every day.”

The Wyoming Board swiftly placed restrictions on Schneider’s license and ultimately revoked it in 2014.

Schneider filed bankruptcy in December that year, leaving malpractice claimants hanging without payment even now, including the Monaco family.

In an interview, Schneider laid blame for Monaco’s death on a physician assistant who prescribed the medications. He said an aide in the operating room caused Hickey’s paralysis, and he blamed Riddle’s injury on a hematoma caused by medications prescribed by another provider. In Deiling’s case, Schneider asserted standard tests didn’t initially pick up the infection or indicate he needed more timely treatment.

Vetting revelations

The VA hiring process is seemingly rigorous.

Applications are vetted, education and licenses verified, references checked, and interviews conducted. For clinical hires, a review and approval by a professional standards board also is required.  

But when applicants disclose prior problems with medical licensing short of revocation, malpractice or criminal histories, VA hospital officials have discretion to weigh the providers’ explanations and approve their hiring anyway.

The VA hospital in Muskogee, Okla., hired a psychiatrist in 2013 with multiple disciplinary actions against his Oklahoma license, including for sexual misconduct, according to internal documents obtained by USA TODAY.

Hospital officials knew about his past, but approved his hiring anyway with the condition he be closely monitored during his probation period, the documents show.

And yet the psychiatrist, Stephen Lester Greer, went on to have a sexual relationship with a VA patient and ended up pleading guilty in August to witness tampering for trying to persuade the patient to lie about it to federal investigators.

More: Candid Veterans Affairs nominee faces big challenges to fix entrenched bureaucracy

More: VA vows changes on bad health care providers, lawmakers take action after USA TODAY investigation

The VA hired a psychologist to work at a clinic in Lafayette, La., in 2004, despite his revealing previous felony convictions on his application, according to the internal documents, which don’t identify the provider by name. The VA didn’t run a criminal background check until a year after he started work. It showed eight arrests, including for burglary, drug dealing and reckless driving resulting in death.

Still the VA allowed him to continue practicing until two years ago. By that time, the VA had received multiple complaints about patient mistreatment by the psychologist. An internal investigation found he was a “direct threat to others, (and) to the Department’s mission.” The VA fired him earlier this year.

The VA hospital in Jackson, Miss., hired ophthalmologist Daniel K. Kim, despite his being sanctioned by licensing authorities in Georgia. During his subsequent surgeries at the VA, a World War II veteran was blinded in 2006 and he allegedly implanted the wrong lens in another patient’s eye in 2012. Kim has denied any wrongdoing, and a VA investigation suggested a nurse assisting Kim caused the blinding.

More: Veteran patients in imminent danger at VA hospital in D.C., investigation finds

More: Senators author bill forcing VA to report more problem medical providers, faster

Psychiatrist David Houlihan landed a job at a VA hospital in Wisconsin in 2002 and was promoted to chief of staff two years later, even though the Iowa Board of Medicine had charged him with engaging in an inappropriate relationship with a patient and taking patient medications home.

He went on to earn the nickname “candy man” at the Tomah, Wis., VA because of the prolific amounts of narcotics he prescribed. The VA fired Houlihan in 2015 after revelations a 35-year-old veteran patient had died from mixed drug toxicity at the facility. He has denied any wrongdoing, but agreed to surrender his medical license in Wisconsin earlier this year.

Some of the VA’s policies can attract medical workers with past malpractice or licensing problems. Agency clinicians aren’t required to have malpractice insurance — the federal government pays out claims using taxpayer dollars — making the VA a good fit for providers who may have difficulties securing malpractice insurance in the private sector if past issues have rendered them too risky.

The Iowa City VA had been looking for a full-time neurosurgeon for nearly a year when Schneider came along.

In his job application, Schneider disclosed “all the issues” and the VA hired him after a “group of his medical peers thoroughly reviewed” his file and “approved his competency,” the VA said in a prepared statement provided to USA TODAY.

Schneider began work in April at an annual salary of $385,000.

Complicated surgeries

Complications soon began cropping up.

Schneider, who describes himself as a spinal specialist, performed surgery in July to remove a benign tumor from a 65-year-old patient’s brain.

Richard Joseph Hopkins survived three more brain surgeries for ensuing complications before dying Aug. 23 from infection.

“Rick was strong, he was a bull,” his sister Annette Rainsford said. “Why would you go into someone’s head four times?”

James Wehmeyer, a 77-year-old Army veteran, said Schneider performed his first spinal procedure in July. The neurosurgeon subsequently did two more operations to try and clean up infection from the first, prompting concerns something might be amiss with his treatment.

“I thought that, but I didn’t know,” he said. “I’m not a doctor.”  

Wehmeyer said it’s been a month since his last surgery, and a nurse still visits him at home every three days to clean out the wound, which he said hasn’t healed.

“There’s a big hole in there they’re trying to close up,” he said.

At least three other patients suffered infections after procedures Schneider conducted at the Iowa City VA — two deep-wound and one superficial — but they were cured with antibiotics, Schneider said.

In September, Schneider was arrested on federal criminal charges of lying and trying to conceal assets in his bankruptcy case in Montana.

His patients in Iowa City showed up for surgery but had to be rescheduled when he didn’t show up for work. Schneider told his VA bosses what happened when he got back to Iowa.

He continued practicing.  

Schneider, who pleaded not guilty to the charges, said in an interview that infections suffered by his VA patients were not his fault, but rather complications that can occur in neurosurgery.

He said Hopkins’ case was a “tragic” example, where he developed two brain bleeds and then fluid buildup, each requiring another surgery.

“I’ve had a great run at the VA with zero issues,” he said. “Have I had to take patients back (for surgery) for post-op infection? Yes. I mean, I can’t prevent every infection.”

One of Schneider’s patients from Wyoming said that whatever the case, the VA never should have hired him.

“Here the veterans, they went and served their country, and they’re messed up and everything,” said Michael Green, who is awaiting payment for a malpractice claim that alleged Schneider placed a screw incorrectly in his lower spine. “And then turn that guy loose on them, that’s what doesn’t make sense.

Online obituary for Richard J Hopkins. (Photo: Handout)

‘SEAL Team’ Exposes VA: ‘A Health Care System That Runs Like the Post Office’

‘SEAL Team’ Exposes VA: ‘A Health Care System That Runs Like the Post Office’

https://www.newsbusters.org/blogs/culture/lindsay-kornick/2019/04/25/seal-team-exposes-va-healthcare-system-runs-post-office

CBS’s SEAL Team has been mostly quiet this season regarding social issues. In its place, recent episodes have taken a deeper perspective into the lives of soldiers during and after deadly missions. This week’s episode offers the latest example with a critical look at Veterans Affairs.

The April 24 episode “Medicate and Isolate” takes a more somber look at some of the soldiers suffering from past trauma. Clay (Max Theriot) who was injured in a recent bombing attack, has been staying with former SEAL Team member Brett Swan (Tony Curran). Sadly, Brett suffers from his own war injuries and must attend an appointment with Veterans Affairs for prescriptions. While Clay has never visited a VA hospital, he’s still disheartened to see it up close.

Brett: Little different from your Rain Man suite at the military hospital.

Clay: Yeah, they definitely leave this out of those flashy recruiting videos.

Brett: This is a soldier’s reward for serving. A health care system that runs like the post office.

Actually, if it were run like the post office it might be better. The setting features overworked and understaffed members who tend to the soldiers. “My workload doesn’t offer me as much time as I’d like to review your paperwork,” the one nurse who attends to Brett says. After Brett and Clay wait all day to meet with the doctor seeking treatment for Traumatic Brain Injury, they are told he has to cancel and the next available appointment is in two months. There are places that treat mail with more dignity and efficiency than our soldiers.

While the episode makes a statement at the end insistent that “the characters and incidents in this episode are fictional and do not represent the majority of Veterans or their experience with the VA,” it’s not too lenient on it, admitting that “challenges faced by these men and women are all too real.”

Bureaucracy and indifference plague government-run health care, something we learned all too well about from the Obama VA scandal in 2014. Just like Brett, there are real soldiers who are put through an unproductive system of waiting lists, red tape and understaffed workers. Unfortunately for them, their plight isn’t always highlighted on primetime.   

As Brett puts it so eloquently, “These old-timers bled on the sands of Iwo Jima to defend our right to be an inefficient nation.” Such is the description for any government-run health care: inefficient and poorly run. Keep this in mind the next time you hear someone call for “Medicare for All.”

In the end, sadly, Brett’s dismay at the results (or lack thereof) from the VA center drive him to commit suicide. Even worse, his case is not an isolated one. We deserve better, and the men and women who defend our nation deserve more.

 

This message is for the Mothers & Fathers of our nation’s youth. It contains graphic images of what could happen to your child returning home from our Armed Forces. It demonstrates the sad truth for your son or daughter, for you and for your loved ones that to die on the battlefield is better than returning home to this #Betrayal. My prayers go out to each member of our military forces and the horrors facing them on returning home. Robert D. Rose Jr. BSW, MEd, USMC Semper Fidelis

 

Efficacy of opioids versus placebo in chronic pain: a systematic review and meta-analysis of enriched enrollment randomized withdrawal trials

https://www.dovepress.com/efficacy-of-opioids-versus-placebo-in-chronic-pain-a-systematic-review-peer-reviewed-fulltext-article-JPR

Conclusion

This meta-analysis of FDA-required double-blind, randomized, placebo-controlled clinical trials of opioid analgesics for the treatment of chronic pain has shown that there is an ample evidence base supporting the efficacy of opioid analgesics for at least 3 months’ duration, a standard period for the evaluation of treatments for chronic pain and other chronic disorders. This evidence base is at least as large as that for any other class of analgesics, and analysis of responders demonstrates clinically meaningful improvements. We have not focused on the risks of opioids, nor the risk–benefit balance, and hope that our review at least characterizes the evidence base for efficacy in order to inform these important broader discussions.

Introduction: Opioids have been used for millennia for the treatment of pain. However, the long-term efficacy of opioids to treat chronic non-cancer pain continues to be debated. To evaluate opioids’ efficacy in chronic non-cancer pain, we performed a meta-analysis of published clinical trials for μ-opioid receptor agonists performed for US Food and Drug Administration approval.
Methods: MEDLINE and Cochrane trial register were searched for enriched enrollment randomized withdrawal studies (before June 2016). Selection criteria included: adults, ≥10 subjects per arm, any chronic pain condition, double-blind treatment period lasting ≥12 weeks, and all μ-agonist opioids approved in the USA.
Results: Fifteen studies met criteria. Opioid efficacy was statistically significant (p<0.001) versus placebo for pain intensity (standardized mean difference: −0.416), ≥30% and ≥50% improvement in pain (risk difference: 0.166 and 0.137), patient global impression of change (0.163), and patient global assessment of study medication (0.194). There were minor benefits on physical function and no effect on mental function.
Conclusion: Opioids are efficacious in the treatment of chronic non-cancer pain for up to 3 months in randomized controlled trials. This should be considered, alongside data on opioid safety, in the use of opioids for the treatment of chronic pain.

Keywords: opioid analgesics, non-cancer pain, long-term efficacy, EERW trials, opioid efficacy; evidence-based medicine

Introduction

Opioids have been used for millennia for the treatment of pain and remain an important therapeutic option. While the American Academy of Pain Medicine, the American Pain Society, the US Federation of State Medical Boards, and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention endorse the use of opioids, when appropriate, for the treatment of chronic pain, efficacy of long-term opioid use remains controversial.16 In addition, there are significant risks associated with opioids and these agents have contributed to the epidemic of opioid abuse, addiction, and overdose deaths in the USA.710 Given these serious risks, the assessment of evidence for the long-term analgesic efficacy of opioids for treating chronic pain is crucial.

The US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) requires randomized, double-blind, placebo-controlled studies of at least 3 months’ duration in order to approve an opioid for the treatment of chronic pain. This reflects the need to balance accrual of sufficient data representative of long-term treatment against the scientific and ethical challenges of longer-term randomized, placebo-controlled trials, including dropouts, missing data, concomitant treatments, and long-term use of placebo. The 3-month duration is the standard clinical trial duration accepted by the FDA for many chronic conditions including hypertension, asthma, depression, schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and anxiety.

In order to inform the ongoing controversy over whether there is evidence that opioids are efficacious for the treatment of chronic pain, we have gathered the randomized controlled trials required by the FDA for approval, and have performed a meta-analysis of their results. These trials are by regulatory expectation 3 months in duration. This review does not address the risks of opioids. A coherent position on the risk–benefit balance of opioids for the treatment of chronic pain requires an accurate and data-driven assessment of both their risks and their benefits. Thus, the purpose of this review is not to minimize, or characterize, the risks of opioids, but rather to ensure that the debate over the risks and benefits of opioids is informed by an accurate assessment of their benefits.

Methods

Data sources and searches

MEDLINE and Cochrane Central Register of Controlled Trials 2012 were searched for all relevant studies published before June 2016. The search strategy for MEDLINE is presented (see Methods in Supplementary materials) and was customized for the Cochrane Central Register of Controlled Trials 2012 (in which only the Intervention and Population sections were used). Additional studies were identified through the examination of references from identified trials, systematic reviews, and authors’ own databases.

We searched for enriched enrollment randomized withdrawal (EERW) studies published in English with double-blinded outcome assessments that compared any opioid (including combinations and dual mechanism analgesics administered via the oral, transdermal, nasal, sublingual, or transmucosal routes) to placebo for ≥12 weeks during the randomized double-blind treatment phase of the study in patients with any chronic non-malignant pain condition.

Study selection

Inclusion and exclusion criteria

Trials with participants ≥18 years of age with any type of chronic nonmalignant pain, including but not limited to chronic low back pain (CLBP), chronic neuropathic pain, diabetic peripheral neuropathic pain (DPNP), osteoarthritis (OA), arthritis, rheumatoid arthritis, phantom limb pain, fibromyalgia, post-herpetic neuralgia, or musculoskeletal pain. Studies of acute or post-surgical pain and cancer pain were excluded. Studies of specific μ-agonist opioids, μ-agonist opioids with additional pharmacological activity (eg, tramadol and tapentadol), or combination opioids (eg, hydrocodone/acetaminophen) approved for the treatment of pain were included. Agents with oral, transdermal, nasal, sublingual, or transmucosal routes of administration were included. Studies were included if they had a minimum of 10 patients per arm and reported pain intensity (PI) as an outcome. The present study protocol has been published on PROSPERO (http://www.crd.york.ac.uk/PROSPERO/; registration No: CRD42015026378).

Selection methodology

Two authors independently screened titles and abstracts using the Abstrackr software to identify manuscripts that met the abovementioned inclusion criteria.11 Full-text articles were obtained for manuscripts that appeared to meet the inclusion criteria or were likely to meet the inclusion criteria. The full text of these manuscripts was read to determine final inclusion in the meta-analysis. Any disagreement on manuscript inclusion was resolved through discussion among the authors.

Data extraction and quality assessment

Data extraction methodology

Two authors independently extracted data from each manuscript using the Systematic Review Data Repository (SRDR) form (http://srdr.ahrq.gov/; retrieved: June 1 2016). A third author subsequently confirmed that primary and secondary endpoints matched the SRDR form. The SRDR is an open collaborative web-based repository for systematic data review. The SRDR form was developed to include participant characteristics, interventions, treatment arms, adverse events (AEs), primary and secondary outcomes, country(s) of study, number of study sites, trial design, blinding, clinical setting, method of recruitment, group similarities at baseline, and assessment bias. If data were not available or incomplete, manuscript authors were contacted to provide the missing data.

Quality assessment

Risk of bias was assessed based on the guidelines available through the Cochrane Risk of Bias Tool of the SRDR (http://handbook.cochrane.org/chapter_8/table_8_5_a_the_cochrane_collaborations_tool_for_assessing.htm). We defined high-quality studies (ie, low bias studies) as those with no major methodological flaws that fulfilled 6 or more of the 11 internal validity criteria.12

Data extracted

The following outcome measures were extracted from the selected publications: change in PI score from randomization baseline to week 12 or study endpoint, categorical evaluation of responders/non-responders (≥30% and ≥50% improvement as calculated based on changes between week 12 and pain at the beginning of the open-label titration phase), patient assessments of global improvement (eg, patient global impression of pain [PGIC] and patient global assessment of study medication [PGASM]), assessment of patient change in function (eg, Roland–Morris Disability Questionnaire [RMDQ] and Western Ontario and McMaster Universities Arthritis Index [WOMAC]), rescue medication dose consumption, and health-related quality of life (eg, 36-Item Short-Form Survey [SF-36]).

Safety outcomes collected included: the proportion of patients with ≥1 AE, ≥1 serious AE (SAE), discontinuing treatment due to AEs and/or withdrawal symptoms post-randomization; AEs during the open-label titration phase were not collected.

Data synthesis and analysis

The primary outcome was standardized effect size, defined as the treatment difference (mean difference in PI score between active and placebo) divided by the SD. We pooled data from all manuscripts regardless of whether the endpoint was presented as mean change from randomization baseline to week 12 or as the least squares mean difference (LSMD) at week 12; if both results were available, the mean change from randomization baseline to week 12 was used. The mean change from baseline was calculated from the reported mean baseline and week 12 data; the SD of the change was calculated by assuming a correlation of 0.50 between baseline and week 12 responses. The standard mean difference (SMD) was calculated with 95% CIs. The change in PI from randomization baseline to week 12 was reported as the LSMD and standard error (SE); in case SD or SE were not available, they were calculated based on the following formula: SE = SD/square root (N). When SD values were not available, the manuscript authors were contacted. We were able to obtain all unpublished SD values. The number of subjects randomized was used in all analyses except in situations where a different N value was more appropriate to use (eg, some manuscripts did not present data for 100% of patients in PGIC tables; in this situation, we calculated the total number of patients randomized based on the percentage of reporting patients).

A binary random-effects meta-analysis using the restricted maximum likelihood method was conducted to assess ≥30% and ≥50% responder rates. The results are reported as risk differences (RDs). The same approach was used for PGIC results (combining “very much improved” and “much improved” responses) and PGASM (combining “excellent” and “very good” results). Function endpoints were not reported in all manuscripts, and for manuscripts that did report function endpoints, a variety of different measures were used (RMDQ, WOMAC, and Oswestry Disability Index). Therefore, no meta-analysis was performed; instead, these data were presented in a tabular format. Quality of life measures (mean change from baseline to week 12; SF-36 or SF-12v2) were combined and a meta-analysis was conducted using a linear regression model. The numbers of patients who discontinued treatment due to an AE were subjected to a binary random-effects meta-analysis using the restricted maximum likelihood method. The results are presented as RDs. In order to assess the percent of patients who benefited from the study drug, a weighted mean was calculated for the percentage of patients who met inclusion criteria (ie, found the study drug both efficacious and tolerable) and were randomized to the randomized double-blind treatment phase. The statistical analysis was performed using the OpenMetaAnalyst Software.13

Meta-analysis findings

A total of 2,018 references were identified from our search; of these, 26 full-text articles were obtained for screening and 15 met our inclusion criteria (Figure 1).1428

Figure 1 Study flow diagram.

Included studies

A summary of the characteristics of EERW trials included in the meta-analysis is presented in Table 1 and Table S1. Fourteen of the 15 studies were considered high-quality studies (having low bias; Table S2). Hydrocodone was evaluated in 4 trials; oxymorphone, oxycodone, buprenorphine and tapentadol in 2 trials each; and hydromorphone, morphine/naltrexone, and tramadol in 1 trial each. CLBP was evaluated in 10 studies, DPNP in 2 studies, OA in 2 studies, and 1 study evaluated a combination of CLBP and OA patients.

Table 1 Study design and subject disposition by study

Notes: aNumber of sites initiated. bConcomitant analgesics were not allowed during the dosed titration. The paper does not state anything about concomitant analgesics for the period following this.

Abbreviations: CLBP, chronic low back pain; DPNP, diabetic peripheral neuropathic pain; ER, extended release; OA, osteoarthritis; OLP, open label phase; RBTP, randomized blinded treatment phase.

Study design

All included studies were randomized, double-blind, placebo-controlled EERW studies as defined by the literature search inclusion criteria. All included studies used a parallel group design during the randomized double-blind treatment phase. In 13 of the 15 trials, patients were initially titrated to an individualized effective dose and then either allowed to continue their individualized dose or randomized to the placebo group during the randomized double-blind treatment phase. In 1 trial,14 all patients were titrated to the highest dose of the study drug and subsequently randomized to a high-dose group, a low-dose group, or the placebo group. In another trial,15 all patients were allowed to adjust the titrated dose after randomization for the first 4 weeks and then the dose was fixed for the next 8 weeks.

The open-label titration phase lasted between 2 and 8 weeks and the randomized double-blind treatment phase lasted 12 weeks for all studies (Table 1). Most studies made efforts to prevent or reduce discontinuation of patients randomized to the placebo group in the randomized double-blind treatment phase by allowing the use of rescue medication (12/15) and/or tapering the opioid in placebo patients (10/15; Table 1). All studies analyzed the intent-to-treat population for primary and secondary outcomes.

Efficacy

Primary endpoint: PI

With regard to primary endpoint measurements, the change from randomization baseline to week 12 was reported by 4 studies as the LSMD,14,1618 and by all other studies as the mean change (Table S1).15,1928 The effect of opioids was statistically significant (p<0.001) versus placebo for the change in PI score from randomization baseline to week 12 (SMD=−0.416; 95% CI: −0.521 to −0.312; Figure 2) as assessed by binary random-effects model meta-analysis using the restricted maximum likelihood method. Only 1 study15 did not report a statistically significant difference versus placebo for the mean change in PI from randomization baseline to week 12 (Figure 2); however, the change in area under the curve between study drug and placebo, which was the study’s primary endpoint, was statistically significant.

Figure 2 Change in PI from randomization baseline to week 12 with active study opioid drug versus placebo.

Notes: The standardized mean difference effect size was −0.416 and p<0.001, with a lower bound estimate of −0.521 and an upper bound −0.312.

Abbreviation: PI, pain intensity.

Other efficacy endpoints

Responder rates were reported in 12 manuscripts (Tables S3 and S4).1619,2228 However, 2 were excluded since they reported respondent analysis as increment in pain from baseline of the blinded period rather than reduction in pain from the baseline at the beginning of the open-label titration phase.26,27 A binary random-effects meta-analysis using the restricted maximum likelihood method demonstrated a statistically significant difference between study drug and placebo for both ≥30% (RD estimate [SE]: 0.166 [0.028], p<0.001) and ≥50% (0.137 [0.022], p<0.001) decrease from baseline in PI (Table 2; Figure 3). PGIC was reported in 5 manuscripts1618,23,25 (Tables S3 and S4) and meta-analysis combining patients “very much improved” and “much improved” showed a statistically significant difference between study drug and placebo in PGIC (RD estimate [SE]: 0.163 [0.029], p<0.001; Table 2). PGASM was assessed in 5 manuscripts,14,15,19,21,24 (Tables S3 and S4) and meta-analysis combining “excellent” and “very good” response showed a statistically significant difference between study drug and placebo (RD estimate [SE]: 0.194 [0.056], p<0.001; Table 2). Functional outcomes were reported in 5 manuscripts (Tables S3 and S4);18,22,25,27,28 however, a variety of assessment types were reported. Three manuscripts18,27,28 reported RMDQ (mean [SD] change from baseline to week 12; study drug vs placebo: 0.4 [4.83] vs 0.7 [5.32], −1.29 [4.98] vs −1.57 [4.82], and 0.6 [5.37] vs 1.2 [5.72]), 1 manuscript22 reported WOMAC (study drug vs placebo: 1.6 [18.0] vs 5.8 [16.8]), and 1 manuscript25 reported functional outcomes on the Brief Pain Inventory (BPI) scale (study drug vs placebo: −3.0 [2.07] vs −2.6 [2.38]) (Table S3). Due to a low number of manuscripts reporting functional outcome data and the different outcome measure used, no meta-analysis was performed. Of these 5 manuscripts reporting functional data, 2 showed a greater improvement in function in the study drug group compared to placebo.22,25 Quality of life data were reported in only 3 manuscripts16,18,25 (Tables S3 and S4); therefore, no meta-analysis was performed. Physical component summary values were greater for study drug than for placebo in all 3 manuscripts (10.11 vs 6.12, 0.1 vs −2.3, and 7.52 vs 3.62), while mental component summary values were greater for study drug versus placebo for 2 manuscripts16,25 (7.19 vs 3.34 and 0.20 vs −0.8; Table S3). No meta-analysis of rescue medication dose consumption was conducted due to insufficient data. The overall weighted mean (SD) of the percentage of patients who were randomized from the open-label titration phase was 63.2% (7.4). Data are presented for each manuscript in Table 1.

Table 2 Summary of secondary endpoints

Note: aValues are the risk difference (RD) estimates (SE).

Abbreviations: AE, adverse event; PGASM, patient global assessment of study medication; PGIC, patient global impression of pain; SE, standard error.

Figure 3 Percentage of patients with ≥30% or ≥50% improvement with active study drug versus placebo.

Notes: The graph shows the mean (SD) percent of patients with improvement, from each study that reported these data. A binary random-effects meta-analysis using the restricted maximum likelihood method was performed showing a statistically significant difference between active study drug and placebo for both ≥30% and ≥50%.

Safety endpoints

Reported AEs and SAEs post-randomization were similar between study drug and placebo in all studies (Table 3). The overall weighted mean discontinuation rate was numerically higher for placebo (42.1%) than study drug (31.0%), and was likely related to discontinuation due to lack of efficacy in the placebo group. There was a small but statistically significant difference in the percentage of patients who discontinued due to an AE in the study drug group versus the placebo group (RD estimate [SE]: 0.021 [0.008], p=0.011). The proportion of patients who discontinued due to SAEs was not included in this analysis because no manuscript reported it. The average rate of discontinuation due to opioid withdrawal was similar between study drug and placebo (Table 3).

Table 3 Summary of AEs

Notes: aOnly data for the 300 mg doses of tramadol were used in this meta-analysis.

Abbreviations: AE, adverse event; ND, no data; SAE, serious AE.

Discussion

The recent claims that opioids lack efficacy for chronic pain have created controversy among physicians, prescribers, regulators, scientists, and the general public regarding whether the benefits of opioid use outweigh the public health risks of abuse and other complications.2730 Chou et al state “evidence is insufficient to determine the effectiveness of long-term opioid therapy for improving pain” based on the opinion that studies of ≤1 year duration do not provide evidence of “long-term” efficacy.4 Clearly if there is no benefit then no amount of risk should be tolerated. This review was, therefore, performed in order to gather together the key evidence to facilitate understanding opioid efficacy within the paradigm of FDA studies required for approval, and to perform a meta-analysis in order to quantify opioid efficacy for chronic pain and assess consistency of effects across studies conducted for ≥3 months’ duration. This meta-analysis was limited to EERW-designed studies, since this design is by far the most commonly utilized for regulatory approval and therefore supports combinability.

Several systematic reviews and meta-analyses regarding the efficacy of opioids in chronic pain have been published; however, these studies were published nearly a decade ago4,3133 and the more recent ones are not meta-analyses.4,34,35 Additionally, many studies included in previous reviews are not relevant to our study because they report alternate routes of administration (eg, intravenous),4 have short study durations,31,36 are open-label32,34 or observational studies,35 have restricted pain types,33,36 or compare different study designs.31,33,36 Although most of these meta-analyses concluded that opioids were efficacious for the treatment of chronic non-cancer pain,3134,36 a review specifically focused on studies designed for FDA approval (ie, of ≥3 months’ duration) for chronic pain has not been done.

The EERW design provides an opportunity to evaluate both “effectiveness” (outcomes in the open-label titration phase) and “efficacy” (outcomes in the randomized, double-blind, placebo-controlled phase). The present meta-analysis demonstrated the “effectiveness” of opioids since a majority of patients (63%) demonstrated a clinically meaningful response. The pharmacological efficacy of opioids for the treatment of chronic pain was evidenced by statistically significant differences between study drug and placebo in change in pain score from randomization to week 12 and in response rates.

With regard to secondary endpoints, opioids were found to marginally improve physical function in the present meta-analysis. Therefore, the use of opioids alone to improve physical function is not supported by this review; whether opioids improve the effectiveness of rehabilitative treatments for chronic pain requires further study. Opioids did not have an appreciable positive or negative effect on mood. The PGASM measure allows subjects to aggregate multiple aspects of their experience, including pain relief, improvement in physical and emotional function, side effects, and convenience, into a single measure.37 In the present meta-analysis, these measures were congruent with the primary finding that opioids are efficacious for the treatment of chronic non-cancer pain. However, it is worth noting that the forest plot (Figure 2) showed that the efficacy estimates appear heterogeneous across studies. While the reasons for this are not certain, possible reasons include differences in study design methodology, inclusion and exclusion criteria, statistical analyses, concomitant and rescue medications, dosing, and numerous other factors.

It is worth noting that AE rates in the double-blind periods were similar between study drug and placebo, with dropouts due to AEs being higher in the drug group while dropouts due to loss of efficacy were higher in the placebo group. However, because patients with significant tolerability issues during the open-label titration phase are deliberately excluded from the randomized double-blind treatment phase, AE rates in the randomized double-blind treatment phase of EERW studies do not represent rates that would occur in prospective parallel clinical trials;38 however, AE rates may be more reflective of ongoing AE rates in clinical practice, where, like in the EERW designs, patients with poor tolerability or efficacy are taken off treatment with opioids relatively early after a trial of therapy.

In a recent meta-analysis evaluating the efficacy of opioids for CLBP, the authors concluded that opioids provided “moderate short-term relief” but the effect is not clinically important.39 In that meta-analysis, Shaheed et al define “clinically important” arbitrarily as a group mean difference in pain or disability >20 points on a 0–100 scale,39 while clinical importance is more usefully viewed as a multidimensional concept that encompasses multiple factors including efficacy, safety, and availability of other treatments.40 It is worth noting that the efficacy of opioids is at least as large as that of any other treatment for chronic pain.38 Thus, requiring a group mean difference of 20 points on a 0–100 pain scale would lead to a nihilistic conclusion that no pharmacological treatments for chronic pain are useful.While the effectiveness of existing treatments for chronic pain leaves plenty of room for improvement, and considering that only a small minority of patients do not experience clinically meaningful treatment responses, discarding entirely all analgesics approved for chronic pain contradicts numerous treatment guidelines, international treatment guidelines, widespread patient experience, and the FDA approval process.

These authors, as well as others,4 defined a 12-week treatment period as “short-term.” While 3 months is indeed short in comparison to the years patients may use opioid treatment for chronic pain, 3-month treatment periods are considered the regulatory standard for assessing long-term efficacy of a treatment in placebo-controlled clinical trials of chronic conditions.41 Indeed, the efficacy of all major drug and nondrug therapies for chronic pain is based on a similar body of evidence (ie, the number of studies and duration of those studies are similar for all chronic pain treatments).42 Thus, the body of evidence for the efficacy of opioids is similar in terms of duration of studies to that for other approved classes of analgesics.42

The 3-month trial duration is not entirely arbitrary: beyond several months, the internal validity of clinical trials tends to degrade due to dropouts, addition of concomitant treatments (permitted or not), noncompliance with treatment, and other factors. While it is desirable in theory to conduct prospective studies of longer duration, so that important complications that take time can emerge, and the durability of efficacy can be directly observed, the feasibility of and the technical requirements for such studies have not yet been addressed. Finally, the inclusion of EERW studies in our meta-analysis allows a richer interpretation of “long-term” efficacy: the EERW design is utilized to assess the efficacy of treatment that has been administered for potentially lengthy periods of time prior to randomization. This design, also called the randomized discontinuation design, has been used in multiple therapeutic areas where it is important to determine whether patients responding to long-term open-label treatment are, in fact, responding to the pharmacological effects of the drug, or just the non-specific effects of treatment (such as the placebo response). Such studies have been performed for decades in oncology,43 depression,44 rheumatoid arthritis,45 cardiology,46 schizophrenia,47 and numerous other indications.48 Therefore, the superiority after randomization of active treatment over placebo among patients who have already demonstrated a longstanding response to open-label medication can be interpreted as long-term efficacy that is not due to a placebo effect or other non-specific factors.

Many of these products have also undergone long-term open-label extension studies to provide information on the durability of treatment responses achieved during the randomized controlled trials; we did not examine these studies in this review; however they generally demonstrate that PI reductions in patients studied in randomized controlled trials remain durable for extended periods.4963

This meta-analysis has several limitations. First, it only included EERW studies, therefore only included results from patients who responded to opioids during the open-label titration phase. The pros and cons of the EERW design are beyond the scope of this review, and have been amply reviewed elsewhere.41,64,65 To summarize, the advantages of the EERW study design are that it is accepted by the FDA for registration of drug treatments,41 can minimize the amount of time subjects receive ineffective or poorly tolerated treatment, may offer improved assay sensitivity, and yields open-label data that may be more relevant to clinical practice than only double-blind data. Another advantage of the EERW design is that the open-label titration phase of typical EERW studies mimics clinical practice with individual titration to optimized doses, an important design feature for medications with high inter-patient variability in optimal dose and a relatively narrow therapeutic index.41 Perceived disadvantages to the EERW design include questions about generalizability of both efficacy and AE data, challenges in comparing outcomes to standard prospective parallel treatment designs, and more complex interpretation.41,64,66 An additional limitation of note is that most of the studies included in the meta-analysis focus on CLBP, which has been a frequently used model of chronic pain because of the prevalence of the condition, and hence, the practicality of conducting clinical trials.

Many of the manuscripts screened in the present analysis failed to report critical information. This necessitated requesting data from manuscript authors, a cumbersome and time-consuming process. We recommend that journals continue to refine and require minimum quality standards for proper interpretation and ease of use in meta-analyses.65 Initiatives like CONSORT (http://www.consort-statement.org/) and the EQUATOR network (http://www.equator-network.org/) have been put in place to foster adequate reporting of randomized controlled trials.

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Gaelen Adam for her assistance with the literature search and Bryant Smith for teaching the authors how to use several software programs that made this meta-analysis possible. The authors would also like to thank Dr. Steven Ripa, Dr. Peter Schmidt, Mary Ma, and Linda Noa for providing missing data from studies used in this meta-analysis, and Joseph Lau for his constructive review of the manuscript. This meta-analysis used methods and software tools developed by The Center for Evidence Synthesis in Health at Brown University. Support for this research was partially provided by Analgesic Solutions and partially by the Opioid Post-Marketing Requirement Consortium (OPC), an industry working group composed of pharmaceutical companies that hold an approved New Drug Application for extended release/long-acting opioids working together at FDA’s request to conduct certain post-market required studies. The OPC includes Allergan, Plc, BioDelivery Systems International, Inc., Collegium Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Daiichi Sankyo, Inc., Depomed, Inc., Egalet Corporation, Endo Pharmaceuticals Inc., Janssen Pharmaceuticals Inc., Mallinckrodt, Inc., Pernix Therapeutics Holdings, Inc., Pfizer Inc., Purdue Pharma, L. P., and West-Ward Pharmaceuticals Corp. Current affiliation for Diana S Meske is Collegium Pharmaceutical Inc, Canton, MA, USA.

Disclosure

Nathaniel Katz has acted as a consultant for Allergan, Plc, Collegium Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Depomed, Inc., Egalet Corporation, Endo Pharmaceuticals Inc., Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Mallinckrodt, Inc., Pfizer Inc., and Purdue Pharma, L. P. Diana S Meske was employed by Analagesic Solutions when the work was completed for this manuscript, however at the time of publication she was employed by Collegium Pharmaceutical Inc. The authors report no other conflicts of interest in this work.

 

The potential legal consequences could be substantial

AMA welcomes CDC’s revised view on opioids guidelines

“The AMA appreciates that the CDC recognizes that patients in pain require individualized care and that the agency’s 2016 guidelines on opioids have been widely misapplied. The guidelines have been treated as hard and fast rules, leaving physicians unable to offer the best care for their patients.

I have stated many times before that it would appear that many practitioners and healthcare corporations have decided that they had a favorite sentence, paragraph or page out of the 90 odd pages of the CDC opiate dosing guidelines and they used that verbiage to profess that they were following the CDC guidelines.

Just whose responsibility is it for these guidelines being widely mis-applied ?  Was it the DEA going from office to office admonishing prescribers about not adhering to these guidelines… I have heard quotes of DEA agents going into a practice and telling the prescriber that the prescriber’s pts were not being weaned FAST ENOUGH and another statement that a prescriber was told that the prescriber would not “look good in orange”.

Could the legal dept of many of these healthcare corporations have taken the position to CYA the corporation and thus suggesting to whatever part of the corporation would believe that they have the authority to create corporate policies and procedures to mandate how – or if – pts with pain are treated ?

Let’s consider some hypotheticals , could the misapplication of the guidelines be consider MALPRACTICE ?

Could the using of these opiate dosing conversion programs that all have same/similar foot notes warning that the results produced by these prgms are CRUDE ESTIMATES AT BEST and not to be used as black/white answers… but as a starting point to titrate the pt’s pain management meds to optimize the pt’s pain management an quality of life. In fact here are some parts of the CDC guidelines that appear to reinforce this:

Here is four quotes from the CDC opiates guidelines:

https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/65/rr/rr6501e1.htm

“The guideline is intended to ensure that clinicians and patients consider safer and more effective treatment, improve patient outcomes such as reduced pain and improved function.”

“Clinicians should consider the circumstances and unique needs of each patient when providing care.”

“Clinical decision making should be based on a relationship between the clinician and patient, and an understanding of the patient’s clinical situation, functioning, and life context.”

“This guideline provides recommendations for primary care clinicians who are prescribing opioids for chronic pain outside of active cancer treatment, palliative care, and end-of-life care.”

What if a spouse has committed suicide because of having their pain medication reduced or taken away because of the misapplication of the CDC guidelines ?  I made this post a few years back

Since I am not an attorney…. these hypotheticals could just be scratching the surface of the total number of potential legal/financial liabilities, it could all depend if it is a independent practitioner or a healthcare corporation. The first there could be several dozens of pts involved while the latter could there could be hundreds or thousands of pts involved.  Of course, law firms will probably go after the deeper pockets and the most pts being harm first.